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1 Introduction
Following the seminal work of Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
a large theoretical literature has stressed the important role of asymmetric information in financial markets.
This literature has shown that asymmetric information can generate market failures such as credit rationing,
misspricing of risk and, in the limit, market breakdown. Indeed, the recent financial crisis can be seen
as an extreme manifestation of these market failures, whose effects are likely to become more acute dur-
ing recessions (Tirole 2006). Deepening our understanding of the extent and consequences of asymmetric
information is critical for the design of regulatory frameworks that limit its negative effects.
Although the basic theoretical issues are well understood, empirical work analyzing asymmetric information
is still uncommon. One reason is that, by definition, asymmetric information is hard to measure. If a
borrower has better information than a lender, it is unlikely that a researcher can do better. While researchers
cannot generally construct measures of ex-ante unobserved characteristics determining riskiness, they can
often observe ex-post outcomes, such as loan defaults. For this reason, the empirical literature, both in
credit and insurance markets, has analyzed how agents with different ex-post outcomes self-select ex-ante
into contracts with different characteristics in terms of price, coverage, or deductibles (Chiappori and Salanié
2000, Einav, Jenkins and Levin 2012, Starc 2014).1
The vast majority of this literature analyzes the consequences of asymmetric information using models of
competitive markets. Assuming perfect competition in lending markets is not desirable, however, as market
structure and asymmetric information can be intimately related. On the one side, informational frictions
can constitute a barrier to entry and thus contribute to determining market structure (Dell’Ariccia, Friedman
and Marquez 1999, Bofondi and Gobbi 2006); on the other, the effects of asymmetric information may
depend on market structure itself (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Vives 2016). This is particularly important for
the environment we analyze, the Italian market for small business loans: as shown by Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2004), legal entry barriers, whose effects persisted into the 1990s, have shaped its local nature and
high degree of concentration.
A recent strand of theoretical research has focussed on the effects of adverse selection in the presence of
market power (Lester, Shourideh, Venkateswaran and Zetlin-Jones 2017, Mahoney and Weyl 2017). With
perfect competition, banks price at average cost (e.g., Einav and Finkelstein 2011). When adverse selection
increases, prices rise, as a riskier pool of borrowers implies more defaults and higher average costs. When
banks exert market power, however, greater adverse selection can lower prices, as it implies a riskier pool of
borrowers at any given price, lowering infra-marginal benefits of a high price in the standard (e.g. monopoly)
pricing equation. This implies both that adverse selection can moderate the welfare losses from market
power and that imperfect competition can moderate the welfare consequences of adverse selection.
We measure the consequences of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small
business lines of credit. We exploit detailed data on a representative sample of Italian firms, the population
of medium and large Italian banks, individual lines of credit between them, and subsequent defaults. While
our data include a measure of observable credit risk comparable to that available to a bank during the
1 See Einav and Finkelstein (2011), Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010a), and Chiappori and Salanié (2013) for extensive
surveys of this literature.
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application process, we also allow firms to have private information about the underlying riskiness of the
project they seek to finance. The market is characterized by adverse selection if riskier firms are more likely
to either demand credit, use more of their loan, or both. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), an increase
in the interest rate exacerbates adverse selection, inducing a deterioration in the quality of the borrower
pool. After providing reduced-form evidence of adverse selection and imperfect competition in this market,
we formulate and estimate a model of credit demand, loan use, default, and bank pricing that allows us to
estimate the extent of adverse selection and to run counterfactuals that approximate economic environments
of likely concern to policymakers.
We begin by constructing a model in which banks offer loan contracts to firms. Banks are differentiated
by their network of branches, the years in which they have been in a market, and the distance between a
potential borrower and their closest branch. Banks compete Bertrand-Nash on interest rates, which also
act as a screening device as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Firms seek lines of credit to finance the ongoing
activities associated with a particular business project, the riskiness of which is their private information.
For their main line of credit, firms choose a bank from which to borrow, if any, according to a mixed logit
demand system. They also choose how much of this credit line to use. Finally, they decide whether to
repay the loan or default. There are two critical correlations in the model: that between the unobservable
determinants of the choice to take up a loan and default (the extensive margin) and that between unobserved
determinants of how much of that loan to use and default (the intensive margin). When these correlations
are positive, we say that the market is characterized by adverse selection: riskier firms are more likely to
demand and use credit.
The degree of competition can have significant consequences on the equilibrium effects of adverse selection
in our model. We show that banks with higher market power have lower incentives to increase prices
following an increase in adverse selection. This is confirmed by a Monte Carlo simulation: when markets
are competitive, more adverse selection always leads to higher interest rates and less credit. As banks’
market power increases, however, this relationship becomes weaker and eventually turns negative.2
We estimate the model on detailed microdata covering individual loans between firms and banks between
1988 and 1998. There are two key sources of data. The first, from the Italian Central Credit Register
(Centrale dei Rischi), provides detailed information on all individual loans extended by the 94 largest Italian
banks (which account for 80% of the loan market), including the identity of the borrower and interest rate
charged. It also reports whether the firm subsequently defaulted. The second, from the Centrale dei Bilanci
database, provides detailed information on borrowers’ balance sheets and income statements. Critically,
this second dataset includes an observable measure of each firm’s default risk, which is called its “Score.”
Combining the two datasets yields a matched panel of borrowers and lenders. While the data span a 11-year
period and most firms in the data take out multiple loans, in our empirical analysis we only use the first year
of each firm’s main line of credit. This avoids the need to model the dynamics of firm-bank relationships
and the inferences available to subsequent lenders of existing lines of credit.3 We define local markets at
2 Handel (2013), Lustig (2011), and Starc (2014) analyze adverse selection and imperfect competition in US health insurance
markets. Each of these focuses on the price-reducing effect of asymmetric information in the presence of imperfect competition.
None, however, articulates the non-monotonicity of these effects depending on the strength of competition, an empirically relevant
result in our application.
3 A similar approach is followed by, among others, Chiappori and Salanié (2000). We model the dynamics of firm-bank
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the level of Italian provinces, administrative units roughly comparable to a US county that, as discussed in
detail by Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2013), constitute a natural geographical market for small business
lending. We estimate individual firms’ demand for lines of credit, banks’ pricing of these lines, firms’ loan
use, and their subsequent default. We extend the econometric approach of Einav et al. (2012) to the case
of multiple lenders by assuming unobserved tastes for credit independent of the specific bank chosen by
the firm. We combine this framework with the literature on demand estimation for differentiated products
(Berry 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 1995). Data on default, loan use, demand, and pricing separately
identify the distribution of firms’ riskiness from heterogeneous firms’ demand for credit.
We face two important challenges in identifying adverse selection in the structural model. First, we only
observe prices for firm-bank pairs that actually established a loan relationship, while to estimate the model
we also need prices charged by banks from whom firms chose not to borrow. Second, while we have
extensive information about firms’ characteristics, there may still be determinants of demand, loan use, and
default that are observed by banks but not by us as econometricians, and such “soft information” (e.g. a
bank’s perception of a firm’s creditworthiness) may determine loan pricing. We address these challenges
using a unique feature of our data, multi-bank borrowing, to estimate a price prediction model with firm fixed
effects. This allows us to predict prices accounting for any price-relevant firm characteristic that is common
across banks and that they observe and we do not. This ensures that our estimates of adverse selection
are not driven by informational differences between us as econometricians and banks. We also address the
potential endogeneity of price in our three estimating equations using instrumental variable methods.
In our results, we find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a statistically significant correlation of
0.16 between the unobserved determinants of the choice to borrow and unobserved determinants of default,
and of 0.14 between unobserved determinants of loan use and default. These results imply that firms with a
higher unexplained propensity to borrow, on both the extensive and intensive margins, are also more likely
to default. We also find a positive effect of interest rates on default, which we interpret as evidence of moral
hazard.
We run three counterfactuals to quantify the effects of adverse selection and understand its interaction with
imperfect competition. In the first experiment, we analyze how market outcomes vary with the degree of
adverse selection and its interaction with market power. We do so by doubling the estimated correlation
coefficients in the unobserved determinants of loan demand, loan use, and default, and looking at how equi-
librium prices, demand, and default vary in response. We then relate these outcomes to banks’ markups
before the change, which we use as a measure of bank market power. This experiment illustrates the impli-
cations of adverse selection and market power in our estimated model and delivers two important findings.
First, consistent with the majority of the theoretical literature analyzing adverse selection in competitive
environments, we find that the average effect of an increase in adverse selection is to increase prices and
reduce the supply of credit. Second, we find that market power significantly mitigates this effect: while in-
creased adverse selection increases prices by an average of 12.9 percentage points, a one standard deviation
increase in a bank’s average markup lessens this increase by 6 percentage points.
In a second counterfactual, we simulate a potential effect of a financial crisis: an increase in banks’ cost
relationships in a companion paper (Pavanini and Schivardi 2017).
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of capital. With this exercise, we seek to separately identify the effects of adverse selection and imperfect
competition on the transmission mechanisms of higher capital costs to the economy. We find that, in the
presence of adverse selection, banks with higher market power are less likely to raise prices following
an increase in the cost of capital. In a final counterfactual, we investigate further the interaction between
adverse selection and imperfect competition by simulating a merger between the two largest banks in each
local market. We find that under high adverse selection, a larger fraction of prices declines as concentration
rises.
All in all, our results show that asymmetric information and market power both play an important role in
the Italian market for small business lines of credit. We find evidence of adverse selection and show that it
negatively impacts market outcomes, leading to higher prices, less lending, and more default. At the same
time, we also find that market power can mitigate the negative effects of adverse selection: when banks have
higher markups, they moderate price increases to reduce the negative consequences of adverse selection on
the quality of their borrower pools. These results speak to the debate on the cost and benefits of competition
in financial markets. While competition is generally beneficial to borrowers, a more competitive market
reduces banks’ ability to absorb negative shocks, exacerbating the effects of adverse selection exactly when
firms might most need credit. Banking regulators and competition policymakers should be aware of these
effects when considering the impact of their decisions on small business lending.
Our paper is related to three main strands of research in economics. The first is a recent and growing
theoretical literature analyzing markets with asymmetric information and imperfect competition. Lester et
al. (2017) show that equilibrium contracts in insurance and credit markets are jointly determined by adverse
selection and market power, and that increased competition and reduced informational asymmetries can be
detrimental for welfare. Mahoney and Weyl (2017) show that when a monopolist insurer’s market share is
high, an increase in adverse selection drives prices down and quantities up, as the monopolist internalizes
the increased default costs of its marginal customers. We add to this literature by taking a model with
similar features to lending markets and measuring the relative importance of, and interaction between, the
two frictions.
The second is the literature on empirical models of asymmetric information. While this literature has largely
focused on insurance markets, we look at the less studied area of credit markets, where the most recent
applications have followed both experimental (Karlan and Zinman 2009) and structural (Einav et al. 2012)
approaches. Our empirical model is closest to that developed by Starc (2014). Her work looks at the welfare
impact of imperfect competition in the US Medigap market accounting for customer self-selection into
insurers’ optimal pricing strategies. We share with Starc (2014) the identification of imperfect competition,
through a structural model of demand for differentiated products.However, the market we analyze differs
substantially along many important institutional dimensions. Insurers in the US Medigap market are heavily
regulated for pricing, minimum loss ratios, and retaliatory taxes, whereas Italian banks face different kinds of
regulations, but have almost no restriction on their pricing of loans.4 Moreover, firms in our data typically
borrow from more than one bank, as there is no exclusivity in business lending. As a consequence, our
empirical approach and identification strategy differs substantially from hers.
4 For example, insurers in her setting cannot price discriminate based on expected claims, whereas banks can and do price
discriminate based on expected default.
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Finally, we contribute to the empirical literature analyzing lending markets. One branch of this literature
applies structural estimation techniques to analyze consumer and firm behavior in these markets (Ho and
Ishii 2011, Koijen and Yogo 2017, Egan, Hortaçsu and Matvos 2017). No paper, however, studies market
structure and its interaction with adverse selection. Another branch uses data similar to ours and provides
reduced-form evidence consistent with various implications of adverse selection (Gobbi and Lotti 2004,
Bofondi and Gobbi 2006, Panetta, Schivardi and Shum 2009, Albertazzi, Eramo, Gambacorta and Salleo
2015). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that uses structural methods to study how adverse
selection and market structure interact in the market for banks’ business lending.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we describe the dataset and the market, and present
reduced form tests of adverse selection and imperfect competition. Section 3 outlines the structural model
and Section 4 describes our model of price prediction and the econometric specification of demand, loan
use, default and supply. The estimation and the results are in Section 5, the counterfactuals are in Section 6,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and Institutional Details
We use a unique and comprehensive dataset of Italian small business lines of credit to study the effects
of asymmetric information and imperfect competition. It is based on four main sources of data: data on
individual loans from the Italian Centrale dei Rischi, or Central Credit Register; firm-level balance sheet
data from the Centrale dei Bilanci, or Company Accounts Data Services; banks’ balance-sheet and income-
statement data from the Banking Supervision Register; and data on bank branches at the local level since
1959.5 By combining these data, we obtain a matched panel dataset of borrowers and lenders extending
over an eleven-year period, between 1988 and 1998.
2.1 Loan Data
The Central Credit Register (hereafter “Credit Register”) is a database that contains detailed information on
individual loans extended by Italian banks. For each of a number of different types of loans, banks must
report data for each individual borrower on both the amount granted and the amount used for all such loans if
their total amount exceeds a given value threshold.6 In addition, a subgroup of around 90 banks (accounting
for more than 80 percent of total bank lending) also provides detailed information on the interest rates they
charge to individual borrowers on each loan. We restrict our attention to short-term lines of credit, which
have ideal features for our analysis.7 First, the bank can change the interest rate at any time. This means
that differences between interest rates on loans are not influenced by differences in loan maturity. Second,
5 The first three datasets were previously used in Panetta et al. (2009). Further information about each is available there. Detailed
information about the last dataset is available in Ciari and Pavanini (2014).
6 The types of loans reported are lines of credit, financial and commercial paper, collateralized loans, medium and long-term
loans, and personal guarantees. The loan value threshold was 41,000 euros until December 1995 and 75,000 euros thereafter.
7 A line of credit establishes a maximum loan balance that a lender permits a borrower to draw upon. The borrower can access
funds up to this maximum at any time and pays interest only on the outstanding balance.
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loan contracts in the Credit Register are homogeneous products, so that they can be compared across banks
and firms. Third, lines of credit are not collateralized, a key feature for our analysis, as issues of adverse
selection become less relevant for collateralized borrowing. Fourth, short-term bank loans are one of the
main sources of borrowing by Italian firms. According to our data, short-term lines of credit represent over
half of total bank lending to firms. We define the interest rate as the ratio of the payment made in each year
by the firm to the bank to the average amount of the loan used.
We focus on firms’ “main credit line” in the first year they open at least one line of credit. In Italy, firms
have relationships with multiple banks to reduce liquidity risk (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso 2000). We
define a firm’s main credit line as the loan on which the firm borrows most. On average for the firms in our
sample, it accounts for around 75% of the total share of credit (both credit extended and credit used). Since
Chiappori and Salanié (2000), considering only the first year is common in empirical models of asymmetric
information. We do so to avoid modeling challenging topics like heterogenous experience ratings among
borrowers, loan renegotiation, and learning by firms and/or banks, though these are very interesting avenues
for future research. This means that we restrict our attention only to the first year in which we observe a firm
in our data.8 This reduces the sample of firms from around 90,000 to just over 36,500. Panel A of Table 1
reports the loan-level information that we use in the empirical analysis. Out of these 36,520 firms, 69% take
up a loan in our sample period and use on average 67% of the amount granted. The average amount granted
is around e370,000, and the average interest rate is 14.2%.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the 94 banks that report detailed interest rate information.
The average total asset level is almost 11 billion Euros and they employ on average 3,200 workers. The
average bank is present in 34 provinces out of 95, but with significant variation across banks.
2.2 Firm Data
The Centrale dei Bilanci (hereafter CB) collects yearly data on the balance sheets and income statements
of a sample of about 35,000 Italian non-financial and non-agricultural firms. This information is collected
and standardized by the CB, who then sells these data back to banks’ lending divisions. The unique feature
of the CB dataset is that, unlike other widely used datasets on individual companies (such as the Compustat
database of US companies), it has wide coverage of small and medium enterprises, almost all of which
are unlisted. The coverage of these small firms makes the dataset particularly well-suited for our analysis,
because informational asymmetries are potentially strongest for these firms. Initially, data were collected by
banks themselves and transmitted to the CB. Over time, the CB has increasingly drawn from balance sheets
deposited with local chambers of commerce, where limited liability companies are obliged to file. The firms
in the CB sample represent about 30% of the total value added reported in the national accounting data for
the Italian non-financial, non-agricultural sector.
In addition to collecting the data, the CB computes an indicator of the risk profile of each firm, which we
refer to in the remainder of this paper as the “Score”. The Score represents our measure of a firm’s observable
default risk. It takes values from 1 to 9 and is computed annually using discriminant analysis based on a
series of balance sheet indicators (assets, rate of return, debts etc.) according to the methodology described
8 To avoid left censoring issues we drop the first year of our sample (1988) and just look at new relationships starting from 1989.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Nobs Mean Std. Dev. Nobs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Demand 36,520 0.69 0.46
Loan Level Loan Use 25,351 246.1 444.8
Default 25,351 0.06 0.23
Amount Granted 25,351 367.3 476.7
Interest Rate 25,351 14.24 4.58
Panel B: Total Assets 900 10,727 16,966
Bank Level Employees 896 3,180 4,583
Number of Provinces 861 34.54 30.19
Panel C: Borrowing Firms Non-Borrowing Firms
Firm Level Total Assets 25,351 11,336 19,825 11,169 3,622 8,601
Net Assets 25,351 2,300 6,499 11,169 931 3,621
Intangible Assets 25,351 360 2,066 11,169 131 1,079
Intangible/Total Assets 25,351 0.16 0.23 11,169 0.22 0.29
Profits 25,351 1,033 2,910 11,169 292 1,403
Cash Flow 25,351 673 2,185 11,169 255 1,183
Sales 25,351 14,478 25,014 11,169 5,029 12,084
Trade Debit 25,351 1,710 3,546 11,169 814 3,617
Short Term Debt 25,351 2,263 5,697 11,169 125 1,512
Leverage 25,351 0.55 0.86 11,169 0.21 0.70
Firm’s Age 25,351 12.92 12.89 11,169 10.73 12.12
Score 25,351 5.36 1.77 11,169 4.78 2.14
Distance to Branch (km) 25,351 2.92 6.72
Number of Lenders 25,351 2.87 2.22
Share of Main Line 19,751 0.76 0.25
Panel D: Number of Banks 702 8.60 4.83
Market level Number of Branches 6,036 14.95 24.46
Share of Branches 6,036 0.06 0.08
Years in Market 6,036 21.06 14.23
Market Shares 6,036 0.08 0.08
Deposit Amount 2,566 21,113 18,883
Number Deposit Accounts 2,566 654 523
Deposit Interest Rate 2,566 6.51 1.72
Note: This table reports sample statistics for the variables in our analysis. In Panel A, an observation is a firm for the first variable and a loan for the
others. Demand is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm obtained a credit line, Loan Use is the amount of loan used in thousands of euros,
Default is a dummy for a firm having any of its loans classified as bad within the next three years (see Section 2.3 below for further details), (Loan)
Amount Granted is in thousands of euros, and Interest Rate is a percentage. In Panel B, an observation is a bank-year. Total Assets are in thousands
of e, Employees is the number of employees at the end of the year, Number of Provinces is the number of provinces where a bank is actively
lending. In Panel C, an observation is a firm. Total, Net, and Intangible Assets, Profits, Cash Flow, Sales, Trade Debit, and Short Term Debt are in
thousands of e. Intangible/Total Assets is the ratio of intangible over total assets, Leverage is the ratio of debt over equity. Firm’s Age measures the
years since a firm’s foundation. Score is an indicator of the risk of the firm computed each year by the CB (higher values indicate riskier companies,
see Section 2.2 for more details). Distance to Branch is the distance in kilometers between the city council of each firm and the city council of the
closest branch of the bank it borrows from, calculated using the geographic coordinates. Number of Lenders is the number of banks from which a
firm opens a line of credit. Share of Main Line represents the ratio of credit used from a firm’s main line of credit over total credit used, when credit
used is positive. In Panel D, an observation is province-year for the Number of Banks, bank-province-year for the subsequent four variables, and
bank-region-year for the last three variables. Number and Share of Branches are per bank-province-year, Years in Market are the number of years a
bank has been in a province since 1959. Market Shares are in terms of number of borrowers. Deposit Amount is the total value of a bank’s deposits
in a region-year in thousands of e. Number of Deposit Accounts is in thousands. Deposit Interest Rate is a percentage.
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in Altman (1968) and Altman, Marco and Varetto (1994). The inputs into a firm’s Score approximate closely
the information that a lending bank has available at the time a loan is granted, as reported in the survey by
Albareto, Benvenuti, Mocetti, Pagnini and Rossi (2011) described in detail in Section 4.1.
We define a borrowing firm as one that is present in the Credit Register. Non-borrowing firms are defined
according to two criteria: they are not in the Credit Register and report zero bank borrowing in their balance
sheets. We use the second definition to exclude firms that are not in the Credit Register but are still borrowing
from banks, either from one of the non-reporting banks or through loan types other than lines of credit. Panel
C of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our sample of borrowing and non-borrowing firms. Borrowing
firms have larger assets and sales and an average of 2.9 credit lines active every year. On average, the share
of credit used from the main line is 76%.
There is ample evidence that firms, particularly small businesses like the ones in our sample, are tied to local
credit markets. For instance, Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) show that lending
to small businesses is a highly localized activity, as proximity between borrowers and lenders facilitates
information acquisition and reduces borrowers’ travel costs. Segmentation of local credit markets is thus
very likely to occur. We use Italian provinces, administrative units roughly comparable to a US county, as
our definition of banks’ geographical markets.9 At the time of our data, there were 95 Italian provinces. We
report summary statistics for these markets in Panel D of Table 1. There we show that there are 8.6 banks
per province-year in our sample, each bank has on average just under 15 branches per province and a market
share of 6% for branches and 8% for loans. The market share of the outside option, defined by those firms
that choose not to borrow, is on average around 30%. On average a bank has been serving a province for at
least 21 years.
Even though our dataset includes both borrowing and non-borrowing firms, we have no information on
banks’ loan approval decisions. For this reason we need to assume that all firms are offered an interest rate,
or know the interest rate that each bank in their province would charge them, and then decide which bank
is their best alternative, if any. In our model, a bank that classifies a firm as very risky and for which it
does not wish to offer a loan cannot formally reject it, but instead offers it a sufficiently high interest rate
to make the firm’s demand probability very low (similarly its loan use if it ultimately chooses the bank).
As such, it allows for an indirect form of loan rejection. Combined Credit Register datasets of loans and
loan application have only recently become available to researchers, as in Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and
Saurina (2014) for the case of Spain. Analyzing the loan approval process is an important area for further
research.
9 Provinces are a good measure of local markets in Italian banking for three reasons. First, this was the definition of a local
market used by the Bank of Italy to decide whether to authorize the opening of new branches when entry was regulated. Second,
according to the Italian Antitrust authority, the “relevant market” in banking for antitrust purposes is the province. Third, previous
research has concluded that bankers’ rule of thumb is to avoid lending to a client located at more than 1.4 (Degryse and Ongena
2005) or 4 (Petersen and Rajan 2002) miles from a branch. In our data firms are on average 2.9 km (1.8 miles) from the closet
branch of their main bank.
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2.3 Default
We define defaults in our data as follows. Banks must report to the Credit Register if they classify a loan as
“bad debt”, meaning that they attach a low probability to the event that the firm will be able to repay the loan
in full. This is done when firms are in liquidation or other bankruptcy proceedings, and for those loans that
have not made payments for at least six months. This warning cannot be filed for a single overdue payment,
but can only occur as the result of a negative evaluation from the bank about of the borrower’s overall
financial situation, and usually occurs prior to a legally certified bankruptcy filing. There is institutional
and anecdotal evidence that when one bank sends this kind of default warning to the Credit Register it
has a “domino effect” on all other loans the defaulting firm has with other banks.10 In our data, 82.3% of
firms receiving such a warning cease all bank borrowing in the same year, 15.1% in the following year, and
all remaining firms within 4 years. According to the Italian Civil Code, information about firms’ defaults
remains in the Credit Register for 10 years, compromising a defaulting firm’s access to credit from any bank
for that period of time.
Following Panetta et al. (2009), we classify default as the event a firm’s main line of credit will be defined
as bad debt within three years of being granted. We choose this window as we are interested in adverse
selection and want the default event to be relatively close to when the loan was granted.11 We choose this
particular limit also because we can trace firm defaults until 2001, 3 years after the end of our sample, and
this ensures that we have a uniform definition of failure for all firms, including those that start borrowing
toward the end of our sample. According to this definition, 6% of new loans default during our sample
period (see Table 1).
2.4 Preliminary Evidence of Imperfect Competition and Asymmetric Information
We provide some descriptive evidence of asymmetric information and imperfect competition before present-
ing the structural model. To save on space, we report the full analysis in Appendix A.4 and only summarize
the main results here.
A positive correlation between bank concentration and interest rates in the Italian banking sector has pre-
viously been documented both for loans (Sapienza 2002) and deposits (Focarelli and Panetta 2003). This
relationship also holds in our data. Using both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the 3-bank
concentration ratio as our measure of market concentration, we find that higher concentration is generally
associated with higher interest rates on loans (Appendix A.4.1).
As discussed in the Introduction, providing evidence of asymmetric information is more difficult as it is
by definition unobserved. Following Chiappori and Salanié (2000), we conduct positive correlation tests
between both the decision to take up a loan and default and between the decision of how much of a granted
loan to use and default. A positive correlation between the unobservables is interpreted as evidence of
asymmetric information, as it implies that firms that are more likely to demand credit are also more likely
to default (in the first case) and that firms that use more of their loans are also more likely to default (in
10 Source: www.tuttocentraledeirischi.it, support web page for borrowers dealing with the Credit Register.
11 This definition captures the majority of defaults: among the new borrowers on which we focus, we find that almost 70% of the
firms that eventually default receive a default warning and no longer borrow from banks within 3 years of their first loan.
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the second). We describe the details of the empirical framework underlying these positive correlation tests
in Appendix A.4.2. Our results indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between both pairs of
unobservables, suggesting that asymmetric information does play a role in this market. These results are
later confirmed in our structural estimates presented in Section 5 below.
Based on these descriptive results, we formulate and estimate a structural model to measure the extent of
asymmetric information and its consequences for market outcomes. The structural framework has four
main advantages compared to the reduced form tests summarized in this section. First, it has a more flexible
correlation structure for the residuals that allows us to estimate them jointly. Second, it delivers more
accurate measures of market power than simple HHI and concentration indexes. Third, it allows us to
distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard. Finally, we can use the structural model to run
counterfactual policy experiments to measure the consequences of both adverse selection and imperfect
competition, and to understand how they interact with each other in Italian markets for small business lines
of credit.
3 The Model
3.1 Overview and Key Assumptions
The model we construct aims at quantifying the effects of asymmetric information on the demand for and
supply of small business lines of credit for Italian firms. We assume that each of i = 1, ..., Imt firms in
market m in year t is willing to invest in a project and is looking for credit to finance it. Firms select their
main line of credit from among j = 1, ..., Jmt banks active in m in t, if any, that maximizes their benefits.12
This determines the demand for credit. Conditional on taking a loan, firms also decide the amount of credit
to use and whether or not to default. We assume that each bank j active in market m in year t sets interest
rates, Pijmt, for each firm i in that market-year based on a static model of Bertrand-Nash competition on
interest rates.
The theoretical model we develop relies on three important assumptions. The first was described in detail
in Section 2: we limit our analysis to the demand and pricing of firms’ main line of credit in the first year
they open at least one credit line. As motivated there, we do so to abstract from dynamic issues in firms’
lending relationships and to simplify the scope of the empirical analysis. The second assumption relates to
asymmetric information. Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we assume that the informational asymmetry
in this market concerns the riskiness of the firm. Specifically, conditional on observables, a firm’s riskiness
is known by that firm but not by any of the Jmt banks in its market; instead, banks are assumed to know the
distribution of riskiness across firms. We also assume that both borrowers and lenders are risk neutral.
Our third assumption relates to how the amount of credit granted to a firm is determined. As in Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), we assume banks use interest rates as their only screening device. More specifically, we
12 Firms make borrowing decisions based on the impact they have on their long-run profitability. We do not have enough
information about borrowers to estimate these profits, however, and so represent them here as “utilities”. This also helps distinguish
them from banks’ profits, which we are able to estimate.
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assume that the amount of credit granted from bank j to firm i is exogenously given by the firm’s project
requirements, and that the bank offers an interest rate for that specific amount of credit to each firm i in each
market m in year t. We justify this assumption based on the institutional features of the market we study. In
a standard insurance or credit market with asymmetric information, insurers or banks can compete not only
on prices, but also on other terms in the contract. Indeed, in environments with lending exclusivity, banks
can offer menus of contracts that specify both the amount of credit granted and the associated interest rate,
for example charging interest rates that increase with the amount of granted credit. This forces borrowers
to self-select into contracts based on their unobserved riskiness, revealing some of their private information.
Importantly, there is no contract exclusivity in the Italian market for small business lines of credit: borrowers
can (and do) open multiple credit lines with different lenders. As explained in Chiappori and Salanié (2013),
in the absence of contract exclusivity, no convex price schedule can be implemented.13 As such, we are
comfortable that the exogeneity of granted credit is likely to hold in our application.
3.2 Demand, Loan Use and Default
3.2.1 Preliminaries
Given these assumptions, let there be i = 1, ..., Imt firms and j = 1, ..., Jmt banks in m = 1, ...,M markets
in years t = 1, ..., T . Let firms have the following utility from their main line of credit, which determines
their demand:
UDijmt = α¯
D
0 +X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt + α
DPijmt + Y
′D
ijmtη
D + εDi + νijmt, (1)
where XDjmt is a vector of bank-market-year determinants of demand (“D”), Pijmt is the interest rate of-
fered by bank j to firm i in market m in year t, Y Dijmt is a vector of (non-price) firm-bank-market-year
determinants of demand, ξDjmt represents banks’ unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes in market
m in year t, and νijmt represents unobserved shocks to i’s demand for bank j. Finally, εDi represents firm
i’s individual propensity to demand credit that is known to the firm but not the bank and is therefore the
source of asymmetric information in the model. We model this as a random coefficient on the constant term,
αD0i ≡ α¯D0 + εDi , i.e. a shock to firm i’s demand for credit from any bank. We let UDi0mt = νi0mt be the
utility from the outside option, which is not borrowing from any of the Jmt banks active in market m in year
t. Firms choose their main credit line from the bank that maximizes their utility, or else they choose not to
open a credit line at all (j = 0).
Conditional on borrowing, each firm chooses the amount of credit to use to maximize the following util-
ity:
ULijmt = α
L
0 +X
′L
jmtβ
L + αLPijmt + Y
′L
ijmtη
L + εLi , (2)
13 If interest rates rise with the amount borrowed, borrowers can “linearize” the schedule by opening several credit lines with
multiple banks. Indeed, in the pricing regressions we later use to predict prices for non-chosen banks, we find evidence of a negative
relationship between interest rates and the amount of granted credit. We thank Pierre-André Chiappori for his suggestions on this
point.
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where XLjmt is a vector of bank-market-year determinants of loan use (“L”), Y
L
ijmt is a vector of firm-bank-
market-year determinants of loan use, and εLi represents the unobserved (to the bank) propensity of firm i to
use credit.
Finally, conditional on borrowing, each firm chooses to default if its utility from doing so is greater than
zero:
UFijmt = α
F
0 +X
′F
jmtβ
F + αFPijmt + Y
′F
ijmtη
F + εFi , (3)
where XFjmt is a vector of bank-market-year determinants of default (“F”), Y
F
ijmt is a vector of firm-bank-
market-year determinants of default, and εFi represents firm i’s propensity to default, which is also observed
by the firm but not by the bank. Note that while firm i has utility from each of the Jmt banks offering main
lines of credit in market m in year t, it only has one such main credit line it can use and/or on which it can
default.
We face two challenges when going from the economic to the econometric model. First, we only observe
prices for bank-firm pairs that actually established a loan relationship, while to estimate the model we will
also need prices charged by the banks that each firm did not choose. Second, while we have extensive
information about firms’ characteristics, there might still be determinants of demand, loan use, and default
that are observed by banks but not by us as econometricians. In Section 4 we explain how we use a specific
feature of our data, multiple bank relationships, to address both issues.
3.2.2 Information Structure, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
The main purpose of the model is to distinguish between information observed by both banks and firms,
and information private to each firm. The former includes both hard information in the form of observable
firm covariates, Yijmt (e.g., firm-specific income statement and balance sheet variables), as well as soft
information known to the bank through its interaction with the firm. Private information known to firms
but not to banks, by contrast, is captured by the unobservables εDi , ε
L
i , and ε
F
i . We assume that ε
D
i , ε
L
i
and εFi are fixed firm attributes that don’t vary across banks, and are distributed according to the following
multivariate normal distribution:
 ε
D
i
εLi
εFi
 ∼ N

 00
0
 ,
 σ
2
D ρDLσDσL ρDFσD
ρDLσDσL σ
2
L ρLFσL
ρDFσD ρLFσL 1

 . (4)
Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we interpret a positive correlation between the firm-specific unobserv-
ables driving demand and default (ρDF ) as evidence of adverse selection: a positive correlation between εDi
and εFi implies that firms with a higher unobservable propensity to demand credit are also more likely to
default. Following similar logic, we interpret a positive correlation between the unobservables driving loan
use and default (ρLF ) as further evidence of adverse selection.14 The correlation between unobservables
14 One concern with this interpretation is the possibility that two firms that are equally risky ex-ante take the same loan and one is
hit by a negative shock after the contract has been signed that increases both the use of its loan and its probability of default. Given
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driving demand and loan use (ρDL) does not have an interpretation in terms of adverse selection, but simply
allows for the possibility that firms that are more likely to take up a loan are also more likely to draw more
on it.
Our model is similar to Einav et al. (2012), but differs in the specification of both demand and supply. In our
case, borrowers (firms) choose among multiple banks who compete for customers by setting prices (interest
rates). This raises the issue of how best to correlate residuals from the demand model, which vary across
both borrowers and alternatives (i.e. lenders), to the residuals from the loan use and default models, which
instead vary only across borrowers. We resolve this issue by allowing the normally distributed random
coefficient on the constant term to be correlated with the residuals from the loan use and default equations.15
This is a practical and intuitive solution, as it allows for a correlation between unobservables only at the
level of the borrower. This implies that risky firms have high demand for credit from all lenders, and not
differently across different lenders.16
While the focus of the paper is estimating adverse selection, we also allow for the presence of moral hazard.
As shown by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), high repayment requirements on loans can reduce the incentives
to exert effort, thus increasing the default probability. Of course, firms that are observably riskier may
also be offered higher prices. To account for this, in our econometric model we estimate αF using the
component of price variation that is orthogonal to firms’ observable and unobservable characteristics. As a
consequence, following Adams, Einav and Levin (2009), we interpret a positive effect of price on default
(αF > 0 in equation (3)) as evidence of moral hazard. We do not, however, make this effect a focus of our
counterfactual exercises.
3.3 Supply
On the supply side, we assume banks engage in Bertrand-Nash competition in prices (interest rates). In
particular, bank j’s expected profits from charging a price Pijmt offered to firm i in market m in year t are
given by:
Πijmt = PijmtQijmt(1− Fijmt)−MCijmtQijmt, (5)
that such a shock was not observed by either the bank or the firm ex-ante, such a positive correlation between loan use and default
would not be related to adverse selection. There is also a further possibility that, following such a shock and an increase in the use
of its loan, the firm’s incentives to undertake risk could change. In this case, ρLF could also be interpreted as evidence of moral
hazard. Although theoretically possible, we believe that these concerns are not likely to be important in our estimating framework
as we measure the amount used in the first year in which the contract is signed, which limits the time in which such shocks to firm
performance could occur.
15 Such random coefficients are common in the literature on demand estimation for differentiated products (Berry 1994, Berry et
al. 1995). Following Nevo (2000b), we interpret Y ′Dijmtη
D as observed heterogeneity in the random coefficient. These firm-specific
and firm-bank specific observable characteristics help us to control for the observable sources of the borrower’s taste for credit
(regardless of which bank it chooses), leaving εDi as the unobserved taste for credit (and source of asymmetric information).
16 We also estimated the model with the random coefficient on the interest rate rather than on the intercept. We find similar
results, in the sense that riskier firms have lower price elasticities and there is statistically significant evidence of adverse selection.
We maintain the assumption of the random coefficient on the constant, as that is closer to the spirit of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
model in which firms have privately-observed differences in demand for credit, rather than privately-observed differences in price
sensitivity. We present the results of this alternative specification in Appendix A.7.
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where Qijmt and Fijmt are banks’ expectations of each firm’s demand and default, Pijmt is the interest rate
on i’s loan, and MCijmt is bank j’s marginal cost of lending to firm i in market m in year t. Expected
demand, Qijmt, is given by the product of the model’s demand probability and expected loan use by i for a
loan from j. This expected profit function corresponds to the standard one underlying Bertrand-Nash pricing
(Berry et al. 1995), augmented to account for the probability of default, Fijmt.
Note that expected default, Fijmt, depends on the price charged by bank j through two channels. First,
the default equation (3) allows for a direct impact of interest rates on firms’ default probabilities (αF ). As
described above, we interpret such a relationship as evidence of moral hazard. Second, a higher interest
rate also changes the composition of borrowers: a higher price increases the expectation of εDi , firm i’s
unobserved demand for credit, conditional on a loan being taken as low-utility-from-borrowing firms are
more likely to self-select out of the borrowing pool. If ρDF > 0, this implies in turn that an increase in price
increases the average default probability of a bank’s pool of borrowers.
The first-order condition of this profit function delivers the following pricing equation:
Pijmt =
MCijmt
1− Fijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Cost
+
(1− Fijmt)Mijmt
1− Fijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Markup
,
(6)
where F ′ijmt is the derivative of expected default with respect to price andMijmt = −Qijmt/Q′ijmt is bank
j’s markup on a loan to firm i (with Q′ijmt the derivative of expected demand with respect to price). Much
like a regular Bertrand-Nash pricing equation can be split into a marginal cost term and a markup, so too can
ours. The possibility of default, however, changes the nature of each term and so we denote the first term in
equation (6) bank j’s “Effective Marginal Cost” of serving firm i and the second term bank j’s “Effective
Markup.”17
The denominator in this pricing equation embodies the mechanisms by which adverse selection and im-
perfect competition interact to determine prices in lending markets. It has two terms: firm i’s repayment
probability, given by one minus its default probability, 1−Fijmt, and the derivative of this default probability
with respect to price, F ′ijmt, multiplied by bank j’s (conventional) markup on its loan to i,Mijmt.
Consider first the impact of changes in adverse selection as measured by ρDF on the first term in this
denominator, 1−Fijmt.18 As discussed above, firms that borrow are more likely to have high unobservable
demand for credit (εDi ). The essence of adverse selection, ρDF > 0, is that these firms are also more
likely to default than an average firm.19 In such an environment, increases in adverse selection increase the
selectivity of the default unobservables, increasing defaults, Fijmt. This pushes down the denominator in
equation (6) and tends to increase prices. We call this first effect of changes in adverse selection on prices
17 If default and its derivative are both zero, i.e. Fijmt = F ′ijmt = 0, equation (6) simplifies to the standard Bertrand-Nash
pricing equation, Pijmt = MCijmt − QijmtQ′ijmt = MCijmt +Mijmt, showing that price can be written as marginal cost plus a
markup.
18 For convenience, we articulate the effects of changes in adverse selection via changes in the correlation in unobserved deter-
minants of demand and default, ρDF . Similar effects obtain if we consider instead the correlation in unobservable determinants of
loan use and default, ρLF .
19 See Appendix A.1 for proofs of the claims made in this paragraph.
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the “average borrower effect”: an increase in adverse selection increases the riskiness of those that choose
to borrow, increasing average default rates and thus prices.
Consider next the impact of changes in adverse selection on the second term in the denominator of the
pricing equation, F ′ijmt ×Mijmt. While signing this term analytically is difficult, we show in a Monte
Carlo exercise in Appendix A.2.2 that when there is adverse selection (ρDF > 0), not only does default
increase with prices as banks lend to firms with higher unobservable demand for credit (F ′ijmt > 0), but
also that increases in adverse selection exacerbate this effect (i.e., ∂F ′ijmt/∂ρDF > 0). Because markups
are also positive, this increases the denominator in equation (6) and tends to reduce prices. We call this
second effect of changes in adverse selection on prices the markup-mediated “marginal borrower effect”:
an increase in adverse selection increases the responsiveness of default to price changes (F ′ijmt), increasing
the relative safety of marginal borrowers compared to average borrowers and increasing banks’ desire to
keep them by lowering prices.
Which of the average borrower or marginal borrower effect dominates price changes when adverse selection
increases depends on the level of competition, measured by the markup term Mijmt, as this influences
the value of marginal borrowers. High levels of competition imply margins are low, lowering the value
to the bank of marginal borrowers, and encouraging banks to respond to increased adverse selection by
increasing prices. By contrast, low levels of competition imply margins are high, increasing the value to
the bank of marginal borrowers, and encouraging them to respond to increased adverse selection with price
reductions.
We further illustrate this non-monotonic response of prices to increases in adverse selection in a Monte
Carlo exercise presented in Appendix A.2. We allow for both advantageous and adverse selection in the
form of ρDF ∈ [−1, 1] and analyze the pricing decisions of a monopolist facing a competitive fringe. We
parameterize competitive intensity by varying the slope of the monopolist’s (residual) demand curve. Con-
sistent with the economic effects described above, we show that when competition is strong (as measured
by high absolute values of the slope of residual demand), increases in adverse selection increase prices and
when competition is weak, they decrease prices.
3.4 Theoretical Work on Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets
Theoretical work on the relationship between asymmetric information and imperfect competition is still very
limited. The paper that analyzes a setting most comparable to ours is Mahoney and Weyl (2017).20 They
study the interaction of adverse selection and imperfect competition in insurance markets using graphical
price-theoretic reasoning in the spirit of Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010b), but extended to allow for
imperfect competition. They model adverse selection as a correlation between consumers’ willingness to pay
and insurers’ costs, causing marginal costs to be downward-sloping, and parameterize changes in adverse
selection as a rotation of the industry marginal cost curve holding population average costs constant. They
show that, when insurers have market power, increases in adverse selection can either raise or lower prices
20 Lester et al. (2017) also analyze the interaction of asymmetric information and imperfect competition, but do so in markets
with contract exclusivity, meaning firms can (and do) offer menus of contracts in order to encourage buyers to self-select according
to their private information. As argued above, there is no exclusivity in the Italian business lending market.
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depending on how the expected cost of the marginal consumer changes. Using linear demand curves, they
show that a monopolist facing an increase in adverse selection will raise prices if, before the change, it
served less than half the population and will reduce them otherwise.
The mechanisms underlying the price response of changes in adverse selection in our setting are different
and stem from fundamental differences between insurance and lending markets. In the insurance markets
that are the main focus of Mahoney and Weyl (2017), adverse selection manifests itself in its impact on
insurers’ marginal costs. By contrast, in lending markets like ours, adverse selection manifests itself in
default rates that impact banks’ marginal revenue. This is evident in the banks’ profit equation (5): banks
must pay the cost of providing every loan, but only receive revenue (and thus marginal revenue) on those
loans that are repaid. Whereas adverse selection can therefore be parameterized as a rotation in an insurer’s
marginal cost curve in insurance settings, it can be parameterized as a rotation in a bank’s marginal revenue
curve in lending environments. Further theoretical work analyzing how imperfect competition and adverse
selection interact in the variety of markets characterized by informational asymmetry is an important area
for further research.
4 Econometric Specifications
A key challenge in estimating the model of the previous section is to account for the differences in the
information set of firms, banks, and us as econometricians. Specifically, we assume that there are factors
observed by all of firms, banks, and us as econometricians (which we call “hard information”), factors
observed by firms and banks, but not us as econometricians (which we call “soft information”), as well
as factors observed by firms, but not banks or us as econometricians (which we call “private information,”
the correlations between which are our measures of adverse selection). We need to ensure that we can
distinguish between soft and private information to properly identify the latter. We explain how we do so in
what follows.
4.1 Price Prediction
4.1.1 Overview
A crucial challenge that we face when implementing our empirical model is that we only observe prices
(interest rates) on loans from banks from which a firm chose to borrow. As such, for our demand model in
equation (1), we must predict the prices each firm faces at all other banks offering loans in its market.21 By
21 While predicting prices would seem to necessarily introduce measurement error into our econometric framework, we believe
the consequences of any such errors are likely to be small. In fact, firms might need to predict prices as well: loan applications
require time and effort, so firms might form expectations for some of the prices rather than asking for a quote from each bank in
their market. The model of price prediction we present below can therefore be interpreted not only as a way to recover the price
that bank j charges firm i in market m in year t, but also our best estimate of firms’ price predictions. Any measurement error then
reflects differences between firms’ price predictions and ours, and may therefore not be a source of econometric bias. That being
said, to be conservative we approach our environment as we would with conventional measurement error problems.
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contrast, for our loan use and default models, equations (2) and (3), we observe and use in the estimation
the actual prices paid by firms.
One of the main determinants of loan prices is borrowers’ riskiness as perceived by banks, which is pre-
dicted by lenders using a combination of “hard” and “soft” information (e.g. financial data versus a loan
officer’s perceptions of a borrower’s creditworthiness). Whether there is an information gap between us as
econometricians and banks as lenders, and whether any such gap is a problem for our analysis, depends on
how well we can capture banks’ actual pricing decisions.
We adopt several strategies to limit the potential extent of this problem. First, we discuss the evidence
regarding how banks price loan contracts, showing that, particularly for large banks such as those in our
sample, the hard information we observe in our data is the key determinant of prices. Second, as described
in Section 2, we only consider the first year in which a firm borrows. In addition to allowing us to abstract
from dynamic considerations in lending relationships, this focus also lessens the information gap between
us and the lender, as we only consider loans from borrowers that approach a bank for the first time, and thus
for whom banks are less likely to have soft information. Third, we select the best model for price prediction
among a variety of alternatives based on both institutional and econometric evidence. Importantly, in our
preferred specification, we exploit the fact that Italian firms frequently have multiple banking relationships,
which allows us to include firm fixed effects in our price prediction model. The firm fixed effects capture
any feature unobservable to the econometrician but observable to and common across banks, including soft
information that we do not directly observe. Fourth, we test the statistical and economic significance of the
residuals from this pricing regression in predicting default. If the residuals were correlated with defaults,
our prediction model would be systematically missing a component of firms’ riskiness taken into account
by banks when pricing loans. In our preferred specification, we find no such correlation. Finally, while we
are confident that our price predictions do not adversely impact our measurement of adverse selection in this
market, we also discuss the implications for our results of inaccurate price predictions.
4.1.2 Institutional Features of Banks’ Pricing Decisions
Before describing the modeling strategy we use to predict prices, we give an institutional overview of how
banks determine interest rates for new borrowers in this market. The datasets we use are the main sources
of hard information used by the banks in our sample. The Credit Register provides banks with information
about firms’ current set of loans, whereas the Centrale dei Bilanci (CB) provides banks with a detailed
archive of firms’ balance sheet information. As described in Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011) using
US data, banks use both hard and soft information to determine their lending policies. The importance of
each factor depends on loan and borrower characteristics, as well as the nature of local lending markets and
borrower-lender relationships.
To describe the institutional features of the Italian lending market, we rely on the results of a survey con-
ducted by the Bank of Italy, summarized in Albareto et al. (2011), of over 300 Italian banks in 2007 about
the organization of their lending activities. Several features of this survey are relevant for our analysis. First,
it shows that larger banks, which are the ones we have in our data, tend to rely more on hard information
and standardized scoring techniques that we are likely to capture with our econometric model. Second,
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large banks have on average twice the number of layers of hierarchy between the top management and the
branch managers compared to small banks. Therefore, as predicted by Stein (2002), large banks are likely
to give less independence to branch managers in lending policies due to the difficulties both in monitor-
ing managers’ actions and in managers’ ability to credibly transmit soft information about borrowers to top
management. Multiple layers of hierarchy also result in large banks having shorter terms in office for branch
managers, in part to avoid branch managers developing relationships with local borrowers and deriving pri-
vate benefits from these. Both of these aspects limit the extent to which soft information can be used by large
banks in their lending policies. Last, large banks are asked to list in order of importance the factors they
consider in assessing creditworthiness of a new loan applicant. The most important factors are: (i) Financial
statement data (i.e. hard information from the Centrale dei Bilanci), (ii) Credit relations with the entire sys-
tem (i.e. hard information from the Credit Register), (iii) Statistical-quantitative methods, (iv) Qualitative
information (i.e. bank-specific soft information codifiable as data), (v) Availability of guarantees, and (vi)
First-hand information (i.e. branch-specific soft information). This ranking portrays the key role played by
hard information for large banks when dealing with new borrowers. The survey also shows that small banks
do rely more on soft information, although even for these it is still less important than the first two forms of
hard information.
4.1.3 Price Prediction Model
Our model of price prediction is based on OLS regressions of prices on an increasing set of control vari-
ables.22 In our preferred specification, we use firm fixed effects to account for information observed by
banks but not by us as econometricians. As we are interested in the degree of asymmetric information at
the time a loan is granted, we continue to use only the first year in which a firm obtains credit from its main
bank, just as in the estimation sample. However, unlike the estimation sample, where we only rely on the
main credit line, to predict prices we use the observations for all firm-bank relationships in place in this first
year.
Firm-level controls in our model of price prediction include information from firms’ balance sheets (mea-
sures of assets and debts) and income statements (measures of profitability and sales), the distance between
a firm and a bank’s nearest branch, and year, sector, area, and bank fixed effects (as well as their interactions,
depending on the specification).23 Given that we use uncollateralized credit lines, which exhibit no hetero-
geneity in maturity, collateral, covenants and/or other contract features important in other types of loans, the
only loan-level control variable is the amount of granted credit, entered linearly or as amount dummies, de-
pending on the specification. The decision to discretize the distribution of granted amounts of credit comes
from the shape of the empirical distribution of the loans in our data, presented in Figure 1 below, which
exhibits a significant number of observations around a few mass points. For example, over 40% of the loans
22 We also experimented with LASSO regressions, but it didn’t improve our results as in our preferred specification we predom-
inantly rely on fixed effects for which LASSO methods do not offer an improved fit. For alternative ways of predicting prices, see
Gerakos and Syverson (2015).
23 In our price regressions, we adopt a parsimonious definition of geographic regions in terms of four macro areas rather than 95
provinces. In specifications that interact area, bank, and year effects, these interactions increase exponentially with the number of
geographic areas: from 1,313 with bank-area-year interactions to 10,802 with bank-province-year interactions. As the R-squared
improves only marginally (from 0.72 to 0.76), and the adjusted R-squared does not change, we choose the smaller number of areas.
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we consider are exactly e50,000, e100,000, or e200,000 and 71% are exact multiples of e50,000.
Figure 1: Distribution of Amount Granted
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Note: Amount Granted is in thousands of e. The observations above e500,000 (15% of sample) have been excluded to simplify
the interpretation of the graph.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 2, with increasing numbers of controls included as one
moves across the columns in the table. As anticipated earlier, the coefficient on the amount of granted credit
in columns (1) and (2) is negative, showing that banks in the Italian market for small business lines of credit
do not use convex price/credit-limit schedules as a screening device. Indeed, controlling non-parametrically
for the amount granted using fixed effects (Column 3) confirms that interest rates monotonically decrease
with loan size. The fit of the regression increases marginally when going from separate bank, year, and
macro area fixed effects (Column 1) to dummies for the interaction of the three variables (Column 2), to
the same with granted credit fixed effects (Column 3). The largest increase in the R-squared occurs when
we introduce firm fixed effects (Column 4), indicating that fixed firm attributes observed by banks but not
by us are an important element in the determination of prices. In this specification, we are able to explain
over 71% of the variation in observed prices, higher than that typically obtained in the empirical banking
literature.24 We interpret such effects as evidence of “soft information” in this market, a feature we are
careful to account for in our econometric model presented in the next subsection.
As we are concerned that banks may set prices based on unobserved firm characteristics that may be cor-
related with risk and that may be missing from our model of price prediction, we investigated whether
unexplained variation in prices is a predictor of firms’ subsequent default. To do so, we used the residuals
from each of the regressions presented in Table 2 as an explanatory variable in a regression of default on
these plus the same controls used in each pricing equation.25 The results of this exercise are shown in Table
24 Petersen and Rajan (1994), Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Cerqueiro et al. (2011) all measure the dispersion in prices
charged by banks to small and medium enterprises. Each estimates a loan-pricing model using lender, borrower, and loan-level
information, finding R-squared of 14.5% (Petersen and Rajan 1994), 25% (Cerqueiro et al. 2011), and 22% (Degryse and Ongena
2005) (67% for loans over e50,000).
25 We use a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but estimates from a discrete choice regression yield similar
results. The controls were the same in each column as in Table 2, apart from those in the final column: as firms default on all their
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Table 2: Price Regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Amount Granted -2.37 -2.39 - -
(0.07) (0.07)
50,001-100,000 - - -1.47 -0.92
(0.07) (0.09)
100,001-150,000 - - -2.44 -1.55
(0.08) (0.09)
150,001-200,000 - - -2.77 -1.98
(0.10) (0.10)
200,001-300,000 - - -3.18 -2.19
(0.10) (0.10)
300,001-400,000 - - -3.72 -2.63
(0.11) (0.10)
400,001-500,000 - - -3.99 -2.88
(0.12) (0.11)
500,001-1,000,000 - - -4.37 -3.06
(0.12) (0.10)
1,000,001-3,000,000 - - -5.02 -3.44
(0.13) (0.12)
Distance to Branch -0.94 -0.70 -1.33 -0.40
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.30)
Constant 16.80 15.53 17.52 15.49
(0.18) (0.13) (0.15) (0.81)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes No
Bank FE Yes No No No
Area FE Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No
Bank-Area-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No Yes
R2 0.294 0.319 0.365 0.717
N obs. 92,596 92,596 92,596 92,602
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions of the interest rate (in percentage points) on a series of controls and dummies.
An observation is a firm-bank. The sample only includes the first year in which a firm borrows, excluding 1988. See Table 1
for variables’ definition. Firm controls include Sector and Score fixed effects, Sales, Total Assets, Net Assets, Profits, Cashflow,
Leverage, and Short Term Debt. Firm controls and distance are rescaled to interpret the coefficients more easily: the linear term for
Amount Granted is in e10,000, and Distance to Branch is in 100 km. Sector fixed effects group sectors into 3 categories: Primary
Sectors (primary goods, minerals’ extraction, chemicals, metals, and energy), Manufacturing and construction and Commerce and
Services. Area fixed effects are based on four geographic areas of similar size in terms of population: North-West, North-East,
Center, and South. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-area-year level in columns (1)-(3), and at the firm level in column (4).
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Table 3: The Ability of Pricing Residuals to Predict Default
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Residual 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Residual SD 4.22 4.15 4.05 2.11
Default SD 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
1 Residual SD vs % of 1 Default SD 4.7% 4.7% 4.4% 0.3%
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes No No No
Area FE Yes No No No
Year FE Yes No No No
Bank-Area-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Amount Granted FE No No Yes Yes
R2 0.088 0.123 0.123 0.121
N obs. 35,316 35,316 35,316 35,316
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions of a dummy equal to one if the firm defaults on a loan, and zero otherwise, on
the residuals of the pricing regressions in Table 2 and other controls. An observation is a firm. All the controls used are the same as
in each respective column in Table 2, with the exception column (4) where we cannot include firm fixed effects. Residual is divided
by 100 for ease of interpretation. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-year-province level.
3. In specifications (1)-(3), we find that the residuals are estimated to have a positive and significant effect
on default: a 1 standard deviation increase in the residuals is estimated to increase default probabilities by
between 4.7% and 4.2% of its standard deviation. It is only in the last specification which includes firm
fixed effects that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the residuals have no effect on default.26
Based on this last result, we adopt the pricing model with firm fixed effects as our preferred specification.
Formally, this specification assumes that the price charged to firm i borrowing from bank j in market m in
year t , Pijmt, takes the following form:
Pijmt = γ0 + γ1Dijmt + γ2Lijmt + λjmt + ωPi + τijmt, (7)
where ωPi and λjmt are firm and bank-area-year fixed effects, Dijmt is the distance between firm i and the
nearest branch of bank j, Lijmt are dummies for the size of the granted loan amount, and τijmt are prediction
errors.27 Using combinations of the estimated coefficients γ˜0, γ˜1, γ˜2, λ˜jmt, and ω˜Pi we are able to predict
prices P˜ijmt offered to borrowing firms from banks they could have chosen but did not.
lines almost simultaneously, we have only one observation per firm in the default regressions and cannot therefore include firm
fixed effects.
26 The 95% confidence interval on the residual in this last specification is (-0.06,0.14). Furthermore, its economic magnitude is
also estimated to be substantially smaller: a 1 standard deviation increase in the residuals would increase default by 0.3% of its
standard deviation, or 1.4% of its mean.
27 With a slight abuse of notation we use the market (province) subscript m also for the four geographic areas defined above,
despite their being aggregations of provinces.
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To predict prices offered to non-borrowing firms, we use propensity score matching: we match several
borrowing firms to non-borrowing firms that are similar in observable characteristics, and then randomly
assign a borrowing firm’s fixed effect, ω˜Pi , to a matched non-borrowing firm. We assign the granted loan
amount to non-borrowing firms using the same approach. A detailed description of the matching model is
presented in Appendix A.5. A similar method was used in Adams et al. (2009).28
4.2 Econometric Model
As in the theoretical model presented in Section 3 above, let m = 1, ...,M index a market (province),
t = 1, ..., T a year, i = 1, ..., Imt a firm, and j = 1, ..., Jmt a bank in market m in year t. Yijmt is
a vector of non-price firm and firm-bank specific characteristics, some observed by both banks and us as
econometricians (e.g. “hard information” like a firm’s balance sheet and income statement data), and some
observed by banks but not by us as econometricians (e.g. “soft information” like the perceived riskiness of
the borrower). Xjmt is a vector of bank-market-year-specific attributes (number and share of branches in
the market, years of presence in the market).
We estimate a system of three equations: demand for credit lines, amount of loan used, and default. To do
so, we use a 2-step method based on maximum simulated likelihood and instrumental variables estimation
(Train 2009). In the first step, using data on firms’ choices of bank, loan use, and default, we estimate
the firm-level parameters across all three equations, η = {αL, αF , ηD, ηL, ηF }, the bank-level parameters
for the loan use and default equations, βLF = {αL0 , αF0 , βL, βF }, and the variance-covariance matrix of
the errors in the system, including our key measures of adverse selection, Σ = {σD, σL, ρDF , ρDL, ρLF }.
We also recover the bank-market-year specific constants (“mean utilities”) in the demand model (δDjmt =
α¯D0 + X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt) using the contraction method introduced by Berry et al. (1995). These serve as
the dependent variables in the second step of the estimation, where we recover the price coefficient in the
demand equation, αD, as described further below.29
Our estimation exercise faces two main challenges. First, we need to account for the endogeneity of prices in
the three estimating equations. Second, as in the price prediction model, we need to allow for the possibility
that the banks’ information set is richer than the one that we use, i.e., that we accurately account for soft
information known to banks but not to us as econometricians. This problem goes beyond that of an accurate
price prediction. To see this, consider a firm characteristic that is observed by the bank and it is therefore
accounted for in its pricing, but that also has an independent effect on the probability to demand for credit
and to default (e.g., the “reputation” of the borrower). If we do not control for such a characteristic in the
demand and default equations, we could generate an omitted variable problem that would end up in the
residuals of both models, possibly generating a correlation between them not due to the adverse selection
we seek to measure. We explain how we address these issues in what follows.
28 One potential criticism of our price prediction for non-borrowing firms is that we can match borrowers to non-borrowers that
are similar in terms of observables, but the firm fixed effect we assign to non-borrowers is a combination of the borrower’s observ-
ables and unobservables, and of course we cannot observe the latter. This can induce measurement error in the price prediction. We
discuss possible consequences of measurement error on our estimates in Subsection 4.2.1.
29 We are unable to use the contraction method for loan use and default as we have a smaller number of observations and many
zeros in the loan use and default market shares. We explain this in detail in Section 4.3.2.
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4.2.1 First-stage Estimation
The goal of our estimation is to identify and estimate adverse selection, measured by correlation in the un-
observable determinants of firms’ demand for credit, loan use, and default. To do so, we need to consistently
estimate the three equations describing firms’ behavior. We discuss them each in turn.
Consider first the demand equation. Our price prediction model allows us to decompose the price charged
to firm i by bank j in market m in year t as follows:
Pijmt = P˜ijmt + τ˜ijmt
= P˜jmt + γ˜1Dijmt + γ˜2Lijmt + ω˜Pi + τ˜ijmt,
(8)
where P˜jmt = γ˜0 + λ˜jmt is a bank-market-year specific component of the predicted price for all firms i
in market m in year t, Dijmt is the distance between firm i and the nearest branch of bank j, Lijmt are
dummies for the size of the granted loan amount, ω˜Pi is the estimated firm fixed effect from our pricing
regression, and τ˜ijmt are fitted prediction errors.
We assume that any determinants of demand observed by banks but unobserved by us as econometricians,
including soft information relevant for demand, will be taken into account by banks when setting interest
rates. We also assume that such information can be summarized by an (unobserved to us) variable ωDi .
Because a firm chooses only one main line of credit, we cannot estimate ωDi directly. However, we can use
the firm fixed effect estimated in the price prediction by ω˜Pi as a proxy for this demand unobservable. We
can do so because any soft information influencing firm i’s demand for credit should also impact banks’
pricing to firm i and will be measured by ω˜Pi .
30 Therefore, in the spirit of a control function approach,
we relate soft information influencing demand to soft information influencing pricing through the following
equation:
ωDi = η
D
4 ω˜
P
i . (9)
Using this relationship, we can define all firm-level covariates influencing demand as:
Y Dijmt = η
D
1 Dijmt + ηD2 Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + ωDi
= ηD1 Dijmt + ηD2 Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + ηD4 ω˜Pi ,
(10)
where Yi are observable firm covariates and the second line imposes our assumption on the relationship
between demand and pricing unobservables. Substituting (8) and (10) into the demand equation (1), we
obtain the following demand utility:
30 For example, suppose that older entrepreneurs have a lower propensity to demand credit due to private savings and this is
reflected in lower prices offered by banks. Given that we do not observe entrepreneurs’ ages, this effect will be captured in the price
prediction model by ω˜Pi which, in turn, can proxy for this unobserved (to us) attribute in the demand equation.
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UDijmt = δ
D
jmt + α
D(P˜jmt + γ˜1Dijmt + γ˜2Lijmt + ω˜Pi + τ˜ijmt) + ηD1 Dijmt + ηD2 Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + ηD4 ω˜Pi + εDi + νijmt
= (δDjmt + α
DP˜jmt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ˜Djmt
+ (ηD1 + α
Dγ˜1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η˜D1
Dijmt + (ηD2 + αDγ˜2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η˜D2
Lijmt + ηD3 Yi + (ηD4 + αD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η˜D4
ω˜Pi + ε
D
i + α
D τ˜ijmt + νijmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζijmt
= δ˜Djmt + Y
′D
ijmtη˜
D + εDi︸ ︷︷ ︸
VDijmt
+ζijmt,
(11)
where Y Dijmt = {Dijmt,Lijmt, Yi, ω˜Pi } and η˜D = {η˜D1 , η˜D2 , ηD3 , η˜D4 }.
Three aspects of equation (11) merit discussion. First, we cannot exclude that any of the determinants of
prices also affects demand and, as such, we have included in the demand equation all the variables that we
have used to predict prices. For example, the distance between a firm and a bank can influence the price
that the bank offers but also the likelihood that a firm borrows from the bank, conditional on the price. The
parameters that we estimate on these firm- and firm-bank covariates are therefore a mixture of the direct
effect of that covariate on demand and an indirect effect through prices. We denote these composite effects
η˜D1 , η˜
D
2 , and η˜
D
4 . Given a consistent estimate of α
D from the second-stage estimation (described below), we
can then back out the (demand-only) parameters, ηD1 , η
D
2 , and η
D
4 . Second, the error term is a composite of
the structural demand and predicted price errors, ζijmt = αD τ˜ijmt + νijmt, which we assume is distributed
as a Type I Extreme Value.31 Third, because the demand price parameter, αD, does not enter equation (11)
independently except as part of the composite parameters of the structural error term, we cannot identify it
in the first-stage estimation. Instead, we estimate it in the second-stage IV procedure that uses variation in
average prices at the bank-market-year level P˜jmt.32
Based on these assumptions, the probability that borrower i in market m in year t chooses bank j is given
by:
PrDijmt =
∫  exp
(̂˜
δ
D
jmt
(
XDjmt, P˜jmt, ξ
D
jmt, α¯
D
0 , α
D, βD
)
+ V Dijmt
(
Y Dijmt, σD, η˜
D
))
1 +
∑
` exp
(̂˜
δ
D
`mt
(
XD`mt, P˜`mt, ξ
D
`mt, α¯
D
0 , α
D, βD
)
+ V Di`mt
(
Y Di`mt, σD, η˜
D
))
 f(εDi )dεDi ,
(12)
where f(εDi ) is the density of ε
D
i , and
̂˜
δ
D
jmt are the bank-market-year specific constants that we recover
using the contraction method of Berry et al. (1995).
Estimation of the equations (2) and (3) describing loan use and default respectively is more standard, as
in this case we can directly use actual prices. For these equations, all parameters are estimated directly in
31 This assumption rules out any effect of measurement error on our estimates of adverse selection, but our procedure is robust
to the possibility that it does not hold. First, as discussed above, firms themselves need to predict prices, so measurement error, if
any, is likely to be small. Second, even in the case that measurement error is not absorbed in the logit error, we show in Appendix
A.6 that, as long as the residuals in the pricing regression of equation (7) are uncorrelated with default unobservables, it can at most
result in a conservative estimate of the degree of adverse selection.
32 Note that, given that the correlation coefficients that measure adverse selection are estimated in the first stage, they are not
influenced by this second-stage IV procedure.
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the first stage. As we explain in detail in Section 4.3.2, we address endogeneity of prices and unobserved
determinants (to us but not to banks) of loan use and default using various fixed effects and a control function
approach. The probability of observing a utilization of L conditional on borrowing (D = 1), is given
by:
PrLijmt,L|D=1 =E
[
Pr
(
Lijmt = α
L
0 +X
′L
jmtβ
L + αLPijmt + Y
′L
ijmtη
L + εLi |εDi
) |D = 1]
=
∫
φεLi |εDi
(
Lijmt − αL0 −X ′LjmtβL − αLPijmt − Y ′LijmtηL − µ˜εLi |εDi
σ˜εLi |εDi
)
f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi ,
(13)
where:
εLi |εDi ∼ N
(
σL
σD
ρDLε
D
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εL
i
|εD
i
, σ2L(1− ρ2DL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εL
i
|εD
i
)
,
φ is the PDF of a standard normal distribution, and f(εDi |D = 1) is the density of εDi conditional on bor-
rowing. Finally, the probability of default (F = 1) conditional on borrowing and loan utilization is:
PrFijmt,F=1|D=1,L =
∫
ΦεFi |εDi ,εLi
(
αF0 +X
′F
jmtβ
F + αFPijmt + Y
′F
ijmtη
F − µ˜εFi |εDi ,εLi
σ˜εFi |εDi ,εLi
)
f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi ,
(14)
where:
εFi |εDi , εLi ∼ N
(
AεDi +Bε
L
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜
εF
i
|εD
i
,εL
i
, σ2F − (AρDF +BρLF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ˜2
εF
i
|εD
i
,εL
i
)
,
A =
ρDF σ
2
L−ρLF ρDL
σ2Dσ
2
L−ρ2DL
,
B =
−ρDF ρDL+ρLF σ2D
σ2Dσ
2
L−ρ2DL
.
The joint estimation of these three choice equations through maximum simulated likelihood delivers esti-
mates of the parameters in η, βLF and Σ, based on the following log-likelihood function:
logL =
∑
i
dijmt{log(PrDijmt) + log(PrLijmt) + fijmt log(PrFijmt) + (1− fijmt) log(1− PrFijmt)}, (15)
where dijmt is the dummy for the choice by firm i of bank j in market m in year t, and fijmt is the dummy
identifying its default.33
33 We use 100 Halton draws for simulation. According to Train and Winston (2007), 100 Halton draws achieve greater accuracy
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4.2.2 Second-stage Estimation
We use instrumental variables estimation to recover the structural parameters in the demand equation, in-
cluding the demand price coefficient, αD. The contraction method in the first-stage of the demand estimation
finds the bank-market-year-specific values, δ˜Djmt, that equate predicted market shares Ŝ
D
jmt to actual market
shares SDjmt. This iterative process is defined by:
δ˜D,r+1jmt = δ˜
D,r
jmt + ln
(
SDjmt
ŜDjmt(δ˜
D,r
jmt)
)
, (16)
where r is the iteration number, the predicted market shares are ŜDjmt =
∑
i Pr
D
ijmt/Imt, where Imt are the
number of firms in market m in year t. Once recovered, we define these bank-market-year specific values
as ̂˜δDjmt. These constants contain the bank-market-year covariates, XDjmt, as well as the bank-market-year
specific component of predicted prices, P˜jmt. We use these estimated constants as dependent variables in
an IV regression on XDjmt and P˜jmt, using cost shifters as instruments:
̂˜
δ
D
jmt = α¯
D
0 + α
DP˜jmt +X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDjmt, (17)
where ξDjmt is the structural econometric error term. A detailed explanation of our identification strategy for
all the equations follows.
4.3 Identification
We address potential endogeneity bias in the price coefficients in our three estimating equations using in-
strumental variables in the second stage of the demand equation estimation and a control function approach
in the loan use and default equation estimation.
4.3.1 Demand Instruments
The unobserved attributes ξDjmt in our second-stage IV demand estimation (equation (17)) can be interpreted
as borrowers’ (firms’) unobserved valuation of a bank’s brand, quality, or stability which are known to the
bank and therefore affect the bank’s interest rates in market m in year t. For example, ξDjmt could capture
a bank’s reputation for offering valuable and helpful assistance to its borrowers in their business projects,
unobserved to us as econometricians but known to firms. Moreover, because we predict the prices that enter
demand, ξDjmt could also include market-specific measurement error in prices. As a first step to address
these endogeneity problems, we include bank, market, and year fixed effects in our second-stage demand
estimation. Bank fixed effects capture bank characteristics that do not vary by market and year that might
otherwise influence pricing, market fixed effects control for time-invariant market characteristics that affect
all banks within a market equally, and year fixed effects control for any macroeconomic changes affecting
in mixed logit estimations than 1,000 pseudo-random draws.
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lending in Italy over time. We can therefore rewrite equation (17) as:
̂˜
δ
D
jmt = α¯
D
0 + α
DP˜jmt +X
′D
jmtβ
D + ξDj + ξ
D
m + ξ
D
t + ∆ξ
D
jmt, (18)
where ξDj , ξ
D
m, ξ
D
t are bank, market, and year fixed effects, and ∆ξ
D
jmt represents market-year specific devi-
ations from the national mean valuation of the demand unobservable for each bank.
To account for the potential correlation between interest rates and these bank-market-year-specific errors, we
use information about household deposits at the local bank level as instruments. Households’ bank deposits
represent an important source of capital that banks invest in loan products. The high degree of autonomy
that local branch managers have in their lending decisions, as described in Albareto et al. (2011), implies
that the ability of local branches to collect deposits at more favorable conditions affects the loan conditions
they can offer to borrowers. The validity of the exclusion restriction rests on the fact that deposit conditions
are determined in a market with different buyers (households, not firms) for products with different demand
characteristics than the loan market (bank accounts and payment services, not lines of credit). These market
differences, and the inclusion of bank fixed effects to account for any effects of a bank’s “brand” in both
markets, as well as market and year fixed effects, lessen concerns that variation in deposits at the bank-
region-year level are correlated with the error term in demand for banks’ loans, ∆ξDjmt.
Formally, we use information on interest rates on household deposits, the euro value of collected deposits,
and the number of deposit accounts at the bank-region-year level as demand instruments.34 First, higher
interest rates on deposit are likely associated with higher loan rates, as higher deposit rates mean it is more
costly for a bank to raise funds. A higher value of deposits is likely associated with lower loan rates, as
the bank has higher availability of funds. Finally, more deposit accounts are likely associated with higher
loan rates, because managing deposit accounts involves fixed costs, so that, for given value of deposits,
a higher number of accounts implies a higher total cost. These predictions are verified in our first-stage
estimates, reported in Appendix A.7. We also find that the instruments are jointly significant in explaining
bank-market-year level interest rates. Finally, as expected, instrumenting for price increases the estimate of
the elasticity of demand.
4.3.2 Loan Use and Default Instruments
We use a different set of instruments for prices in the loan use and default equations. In this case, endogeneity
comes from potential heterogeneity (observed by banks) in firms’ need for external funds and likelihood of
repayment which may be correlated with interest rates Pijmt. In particular, banks may price based on soft
information, unobserved to us as econometricians, which determines loan use and default. To correct for
any potential bias, we need price variation that is orthogonal to a firms’ unobserved riskiness and need for
external funds.
We adopt a two-part strategy to address this potential bias. First, we include bank and market-year fixed
effects, which capture, respectively, market- and time-constant bank characteristics and any market-year-
34 We only have information about deposits at the bank-region-year level, where regions are geographic areas that include on
average 5 markets (provinces).
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specific unobservables. Second, following Nevo (2001) and Hausman and Taylor (1981), we use prices in
other markets as an instrument in the loan use and default equations. The logic of this instrument is that
banks face cost shocks that are common across markets and are reflected in their interest rates. For example,
idiosyncratic costs of obtaining funds for lending from the interbank market are common across markets
within a bank-year. Furthermore, conditional on the large set of controls we include in our estimating
equations, including the bank and market-year fixed effects described above, we think it unlikely that prices
charged by banks in other markets are correlated with a firm’s decision regarding the amount of its loan to
use or to default.35 Thus we instrument the prices charged by a bank j in a market m in year t with the
average of the prices that the same bank charges in all the other markets in the same year. The first-stage
regression reported in Appendix A.7 shows that prices in other markets are indeed relevant: an increase
in interest rates in other markets implies statistically significantly higher interest rates in a bank’s home
market.
Given the nonlinearity of the first-stage estimating equations, we address potential endogeneity concerns
in the loan use and default equations using a control function approach (Train 2009). We regress observed
interest rates Pijmt on the same observables that we use for loan use and default, as well as the instrument
(prices in other markets). We then use the residuals from this pricing regression ûijmt as controls in the
utility from choosing how much of a loan to use and the utility from defaulting. In practice, this amounts to
including ûijmt in the estimating equations (13) and (14).
This control function approach has two benefits. First, conditional on the residuals, ûijmt, and other controls,
the remaining price variability is attributable to variation in the instrument (prices in other markets) that is
orthogonal to the unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to draw and to default on the credit line,
resolving any endogeneity concerns. Second, it also resolves any concerns about soft information that is
observed to banks but not to us as econometricians. As long as any soft information used by bank j to price
the loan offered to firm i is orthogonal to prices in other markets (as is likely), the control function residual,
ûijmt, will include this soft information, preventing it from biasing our estimates of adverse selection.
5 Estimation and Results
The observables that we include in firms’ demand, loan use, and default equations are the firm and bank
characteristics summarized in Table 1. These are selected based on statistical testing and insights from the
literature. Among firm characteristics, we control for different measures of firm size, in the form of assets
and sales, but also for measures of firms’ current performance, in terms of profits and cash flow (Albareto
et al. 2011). We also control for other specific forms of finance that firms have access to, such as credit
from suppliers (trade debit), as well as for the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, a measure of asset
35 The common concern using prices in other markets as an instrument in demand estimation is that there can be unobserved de-
mand shocks that are correlated across markets, for example national advertising strategies, that invalidate the exclusion restriction.
It is for this reason that we rely on household deposits instead as instruments in the demand equation. Such issues are unlikely to
be important for firms’ loan use and default decisions, however. These choices are made after a loan is secured and are likely to be
determined by firms’ financial situation, not whether and how much their particular bank advertises.
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pledgeability (Petersen and Rajan 1995). We include the firm’s age and the distance between the city council
where the firm is located and the city council where the closest branch of each bank in the firm’s choice set
is located (Degryse and Ongena 2005). We also include fixed effects for the Score, the firm’s industrial
sector (primary, secondary, or tertiary), the granted loan amount, and various combinations of bank, market,
and year dummies.36 Finally, we include the predicted interest rate in the demand equation, and the actual
interest rate in the loan use and default equations. Among bank characteristics, we include the number and
the share of branches that a bank has in a market-year, as well as the number of years that it has been in the
market. These variables capture the experience a bank has in a market as well as the density of its network
of branches with respect to its competitors, both of which can be factors influencing firms’ decisions.
We estimate our structural model on a subset of the full data for computational and institutional reasons.
Following Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), we define a local banking market as the geographic area outside
which borrowers don’t choose lenders, meaning the markets should not be too small, and also within which
there are no overlapping markets, meaning that markets should not be too big. Based on this and on our
assumption that the choice set of a borrowing firm is given by the banks actively lending in its market, out of
a sample of 977 market-year combinations in our original data, we drop the first and last decile of the market
size distribution.37 This leaves us with 702 market-year combinations in our estimation sample.
5.1 Results
The estimates of the structural model are presented in Table 4. The three columns of results refer to the
demand, loan use, and default equations, respectively. The top panel in the table shows the effect of firm
characteristics, the middle panel the effect of bank characteristics, and the bottom panel the covariance
matrix of unobservable determinants of demand for credit, loan use, and default. Our measures of adverse
selection – the estimated correlation between the demand and default unobservables (ρDF ) and the loan use
and default unobservables (ρLF ) – are reported in a box at the bottom of the table.
We find that, as expected, higher interest rates have a negative impact on demand for loans from a given
bank. Furthermore, as described in Section 4.3 and reported in Appendix A.7, instrumenting for price
makes demand more elastic. Using these estimates, we calculate the mean own- and cross-price elasticities
for the five largest banks in the sample and find that a 10% increase in interest rates reduces a bank’s own
market share by slightly more than 10% and increases competitor banks’ shares by slightly less than 1%.
Firms with more cash flow and trade debit are less likely to borrow, but firms with more assets, profits, and
sales are more likely to borrow. Older firms are also more likely to borrow. Firms tend to favor banks that
are closer, and with a higher number and share of branches in the market. They are also more likely to
36 As explained in Section 4.2, we estimate the demand model in two steps, and the loan use and default models in one step. In
the first step we estimate jointly some parameters of demand and all parameters of loan use and default. In this stage we can rely
on variation across firms as well as variation across markets and time and therefore can include a richer array of bank, market, and
year controls (bank-market-year fixed effects for demand and bank and market-year fixed effects for loan use and default). In the
second step, we estimate the remaining parameters of the demand model, including separate bank, market, and year fixed effects
along with other bank-market-year level controls.
37 To improve the convergence of the contraction mapping, we also eliminated a few markets with zero or near-zero market
shares of the outside option.
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choose loans from older banks.
The estimated effects of these same covariates on loan use follow the same pattern as for demand for most
of the relevant variables. As far as the default probability is concerned, it increases with interest rates. Firms
with more trade debit face a higher rate, while the opposite is true for cash flow and sales. Note that, given
our control function approach, the price variability used to estimate the price coefficient is orthogonal to
both observed or unobserved firm characteristics. As such, it measures how the default probability increases
when a firm faces an exogenously higher interest rate. Following Adams et al. (2009), we interpret its
positive coefficient as evidence of moral hazard. The marginal effect of price on default implies that a one
standard deviation increase in interest rate (a 4.6 percentage point increase) translates into a 0.12 percentage
points increase in default probability, or 2% of the average default rate.
The box in the third panel of Table 4 presents our primary parameters of interest: estimates of adverse
selection between both demand and default and between loan use and default. The correlation coefficient
between unobservables in the demand and in the default equations is 0.16, that between unobservables in
the loan use and in the default equations is 0.14, and both are highly significant. In line with the insight
of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we find that firms with an unexpectedly high propensity to borrow are also
unexpectedly more likely to default. We also find that firms that use an unexpectedly high amount of their
granted credit are also unexpectedly more likely to default. We present counterfactual exercises that help
interpret the economic significance of these estimated magnitudes after discussing the fit of the model and
alternative explanations for our interpretation of these correlations as adverse selection.
5.2 Fit of the Model
In Table 5 we provide some descriptive statistics on the fit of the model. We choose to focus on the main
objects of interest of the model: the predicted demand probabilities, amounts of loan used, default probabil-
ities, effective marginal costs, and effective markups.38 We recover each bank’s borrower-specific marginal
cost using the pricing equation (6) as follows:
M̂Cijmt = P˜ijmt
[
1− F̂ijmt + F̂ ′ijmtM̂ijmt
]
− (1− F̂ijmt)M̂ijmt
1− F̂ijmt + F̂ ′ijmtM̂ijmt
, (19)
where M̂ijmt = −Q̂ijmt/Q̂′ijmt is the predicted markup for bank j on a loan to firm i, F̂ijmt is the predicted
expected default probability of firm i on that loan, and F̂ ′ijmt is its derivative with respect to the price. Given
M̂Cijmt, we calculate effective marginal costs and effective markups as shown in equation (6).
Table 5 shows that the model fits the mean of the data well, but predicts less variation than that in the
data. Despite the relative inelastic own-firm demand, we estimate effective markups of 71 basis points
(.71 percentage points, or 5% of the average interest rate of 14.48 percent).39 To help validate our model
estimates, we investigated whether our predicted marginal costs correlate with information about banks’
38 When predicting demand probabilities we set the econometric error (∆ξDjmt) to zero as otherwise we would perfectly predict
market shares regardless of our parameter estimates.
39 We find that for 957 firms out of 36,520 (2.6%), there is at least one firm-bank observation with a negative predicted marginal
cost. We omit those firms from this table and from the counterfactual analysis.
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Table 4: Structural Estimates
Demand Loan Use Default
Price
{
Interest Rate -1.45 -0.01 1.06
(0.62) (0.00) (0.02)
Assets

Total Assets 5.84 0.09 -0.04
(0.08) (0.00) (0.03)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.82 -0.01 0.08
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Profitability

Profits 1.12 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Firm Level Cash Flow -0.93 -0.05 -0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Sales 7.16 -0.01 -0.34
(0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
Debt
{
Trade Debit -3.44 -0.04 0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Others

Firm’s Age 0.23 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Distance to Branch -1.22 -0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.06)

Number of Branches 4.38 0.01 0.03
(0.15) (0.00) (0.02)
Bank Level Share of Branches 0.53 -0.07 -0.27
(0.04) (0.01) (0.10)
Years in Market 0.06 0.01 -0.13
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02)

Score Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
First-stage Fixed Effects Loan Amount Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Market-Year Yes No No
Bank No Yes Yes
Market-Year No Yes Yes
Observations 506,230 25,351 25,351
Covariance Matrix (Σ)

σD = 0.34
(0.00)
ρDL = 0.10 σL = 0.30
(0.00) (0.00)
Adverse Selection
ρDF = 0.16 ρLF = 0.14 σF = 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Note: All coefficients are estimated in the first stage, with the exception of the Interest Rate, the Number of Branches, the Share
of Branches and the Years in Market for the demand equation, that are estimated in the second stage. Second stage fixed effects,
only for the demand equation, are at the bank, market and year level. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are
in brackets. First stage standard errors are calculated by the inverse of the Information matrix, obtained providing the solver with
analytical gradient and hessian. Second stage standard errors are computed with 200 bootstrap replications.
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Table 5: Descriptives on Model Fit
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev.
Actual Demand 506,230 7.21 25.87
Predicted Demand 506,230 7.21 15.16
Actual Loan Use 25,351 246.06 444.75
Predicted Loan Use 25,351 245.42 297.34
Actual Default 25,351 5.83 23.44
Predicted Default 25,351 5.82 9.74
Predicted Price 452,594 14.48 4.54
Predicted Effective Marginal Cost 452,594 13.77 4.57
Predicted Effective Markup 452,594 0.71 0.48
Note: All variables are predicted at the firm level. Actual Demand is a dummy equal to one if the firm takes the loan from a bank
and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100. Predicted Demand is the respective demand probability from our model, again multiplied
by 100. Actual and Predicted Loan Use refer to loan use in the data and in our model, in thousands of e. Actual Default is a
dummy equal to one if the firm defaults and zero otherwise, multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation. Predicted Default is the
respective default probability from our model, again multiplied by 100. Predicted Price is the interest rate predicted by our model as
of equation (6). Predicted Effective Marginal Cost and Predictive Effective Markup are computed based on the two right hand side
terms in equation (6), with Effective Markup being the negative of the second term. Predicted Price, Effective Marginal Cost, and
Effective Markup have fewer observations than Actual and Predicted Demand as there is no predicted price for the outside good.
costs to which we have access. We find that conditional on bank, region, and year fixed effects, our estimated
marginal costs are negatively correlated with the value of deposits, positively correlated with the number of
deposit accounts, and positively correlated (but with no statistical significance) with deposit interest rates.
These support our use of these variables as instruments in our second-stage demand estimation.
5.3 Alternative Explanations for Positive ρDF and ρLF
We interpret a positive correlation between unobserved determinants of the demand for credit and firms’
decision to default, ρDF and ρLF , as evidence of adverse selection, but alternative explanations for such a
correlation are possible. One alternative is that it arises because of agency issues between equity and debt
holders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that debt financing gives rise to agency costs, causing firms
to make decisions that don’t serve shareholders’ interests. In our context, this would imply risk-shifting
by firms with more debt, which in turn would decrease the quality of firms’ projects and increase their
default probabilities. More generally, firms and banks could adjust their financing structure as asymmetric
information varies. Another possible explanation follows from Myers (1977), who argues that firms with
more debt are more likely to run into debt overhang, declining to fund good projects and increasing their
default probabilities.
While theoretically sound, we believe that these alternative explanations are unlikely to hold in our data.
With respect to agency issues and risk-shifting, we rely on a sample of small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), most of which are owned and controlled by an individual or a family.40 In these firms, ownership
40 Bugamelli, Cannari, Lotti and Magri (2012) show that 85.6% of Italian SMEs are family businesses, and in 66.3% of these
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is concentrated and bank debt is, with trade debit, the main source of finance.41 Typically, owners of family
firms hold a large portion of their overall wealth in the firm itself (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002)
and, as a consequence, undertake less risky, more conservative projects than a well-diversified owner or an
external CEO (Michelacci and Schivardi 2013). Moreover, in all our regressions we control for various in-
dicators of the incentives to engage in risk-shifting, including net worth, cash flows, profits, and trade debit.
We feel that excessive risk-taking is therefore unlikely to arise due to firms’ financial structure.
With respect to theories of debt overhang, we look only at firms’ first entry into credit markets, when firms
have relatively low levels of debt.42 Furthermore, the solution proposed by Myers (1977) to suboptimal
investments caused by agency costs is to shorten debt maturity, concluding that permanent debt capital is
best implemented by rolling over short-maturity debt claims. In our setting, credit lines can be closed at any
time by the bank, thus the specific loans we consider are less likely to give rise to these agency issues.
6 Counterfactuals
We run three counterfactual policy experiments to quantify the effects of adverse selection, as well as to
understand the relationship between adverse selection and imperfect competition. In the first counterfactual,
we analyze the impact of an increase in adverse selection on equilibrium prices, demand, loan use, and
default. Its goal is to quantify the economic implications of our estimates of adverse selection in terms of
relevant outcome variables. We examine how prices, demand, loan use, and default vary as we increase the
correlation between unobserved determinants of demand, loan use, and default, as well as how these effects
change with banks’ market power.
In our second counterfactual exercise we increase banks’ marginal costs under our estimated baseline level
of adverse selection and analyze its consequences for equilibrium prices, demand, loan use, and default.
Increases in the cost of funding can be related to situations of distress in financial markets, to changes
in monetary policy, and to macro-prudential policies imposing tougher capital requirements. With this
exercise we seek to identify how adverse selection and imperfect competition, and their interactions, affect
the transmission mechanisms of banks’ higher capital costs to lending activity.
With the last counterfactual, we investigate further the interaction between adverse selection and imperfect
competition by simulating a merger between the two largest banks in each local market, both under our
estimated baseline and a higher level of adverse selection.
cases the family also manages the firm, compared to 25.8% of such cases in France, 28.0% in Germany, 35.5% in Spain, and 10.4%
in the UK.
41 Equity markets were very underdeveloped in Italy during the years of our data (Demekas, Potter and Pradhan 1995). There
were less than 400 firms on the stock market and SMEs were very unlikely to list. Furthermore, Barba Navaretti, Bugamelli,
Schivardi, Altomonte, Horgos and Maggioni (2011) show that the share of firms financed by venture capital is between 0.35% and
0.52%, and the bond market for small firms is non-existent due to legal restrictions on bond issuances for SMEs.
42 The average leverage of new borrowers is below 50%, while that of borrowers beyond the first year is above 55%.
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6.1 The Effects of Increased Adverse Selection
In our first counterfactual exercise, we analyze the consequences for market outcomes of an increase in
adverse selection, implemented by doubling the estimated correlation coefficients between unobserved de-
terminants of demand, loan use, and default, ρDF and ρLF .43 We first predict market outcomes with greater
adverse selection and then investigate whether and how the changes that we observe from our (estimated)
baseline levels are correlated with measures of banks’ market power. As is typical in counterfactual exer-
cises, we assume that marginal costs remain the same in the counterfactual scenario, although “effective
marginal costs” change with changes in counterfactual default rates. We re-calculate firms’ demand proba-
bilities, loan use, and default probabilities with the counterfactual level of adverse selection, and derive new
equilibrium prices as:
P ijmt =
M̂Cijmt
1− F ijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt
+
(1− F ijmt)Mijmt
1− F ijmt + F ′ijmtMijmt
, (20)
where M̂Cijmt is each bank’s borrower-specific marginal cost from equation (19), and F ijmt andMijmt =
−Qijmt/Q′ijmt are the new equilibrium default probabilities and markups in the counterfactual setting, with
equilibrium quantities Qijmt given by the counterfactual demand probabilities (Q
D
ijmt) multiplied by the
counterfactual amount of loan used (QLijmt).
44 We then compute the changes in these variables with respect
to the same variables predicted by the model at our estimated parameters, what we call the “baseline” case.
We report these changes at the firm-market-year level (i.e., aggregated across banks for each firm), both in
percentage points (P.P.) and as a change relative to predicted baseline levels (%).45
The first group of columns in Table 6 shows that a doubling in the correlation between unobserved determi-
nants of demand, loan use, and default (ρDF and ρLF ) causes a 1.87 percentage points (or 12.9%) increase
in the average interest rates offered by banks. There is substantial heterogeneity in these price responses,
however, with interest rates to some firms more than doubling and many not changing at all.46 Demand
probabilities decline by 1.28 percentage points (4.1%), as does (slightly) loan use (by e700 or 0.3%). On
average, higher adverse selection significantly worsens banks’ pool of borrowers, more than doubling aver-
age default probabilities (from 5.5 to 11.4 percent).47
43 We have experimented with larger and smaller changes in these correlation coefficients and obtain results scaled in proportion
to the change in the ρ’s. We increase both correlation coefficients as they are both measures of adverse selection, and from a policy
perspective we are more interested in their combined effect than in their relative importance.
44 In some cases, our model predicts negative loan use. Given that we compute growth rates, to avoid loosing such observations
in those cases we set loan use to 1e.
45 The percentage variation in prices is measured as ∆Pijmt = 100 × P ijmt−P˜ijmt
P˜ijmt
, where P ijmt is the new counterfactual
price and P˜ijmt is the price predicted by our model in the baseline case. We define similarly percentage variations in demand
probabilities and loan use. The percentage point change in prices is measured as ∆Pijmt = P ijmt − P˜ijmt, whereas for demand
probabilities it is measured as ∆QDijmt = 100×(QDijmt−Q̂Dijmt), and similarly for default. We only analyze and report percentage
point variation for default, given that the very small baseline probabilities can give rise to very large percentage changes that are
harder to interpret.
46 The large increase in some rates represents an implicit way for the model to predict that a bank “rejects” a risky borrower by
ensuring the firm has both a low demand probability and a low loan use if a loan is taken. A richer dataset including loan approval
information would allow us to address this aspect of lending decisions.
47 In Appendix Figure A.5, we show that increased adverse selection predicts more mass in both tails of the default distribution.
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Counterfactual Changes in Outcomes
for Higher Adverse Selection and Higher Marginal Costs
Higher Adverse Selection Higher Marginal Costs
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
P.P. Price Variation 35,563 1.87 5.76 1.78 3.50
% Price Variation 35,563 12.9 40.9 11.0 18.6
P.P. Demand Variation 35,563 -1.28 6.17 -1.47 4.96
% Demand Variation 35,563 -4.1 14.5 -5.0 10.0
Loan Use Variation 35,563 -0.7 2.4 -0.7 1.4
% Loan Use Variation 35,563 -0.3 2.0 -0.6 2.2
P.P. Default Variation 35,563 5.84 22.37 1.84 4.58
Note: These variables are average changes at the firm-market-year level. See footnote 45 for variable definitions. Loan Use changes
are in thousands of e. Higher Adverse Selection corresponds to a doubling of the estimated values for ρDF and ρLF from Table 4;
Higher Marginal Costs corresponds to a 5% (approximately 70 basis points) increase in banks’ marginal costs.
We are particularly interested in how these predicted changes in prices, quantities (both demand and loan
use), and default vary with banks’ market power. To do so, we use as a measure of market power the
fitted “effective markups” facing each firm at our estimated baseline levels of adverse selection. We then
run OLS regressions of our predicted changes in firms’ interest rates, demand probabilities, loan use, and
default probabilities on these measures of banks’ market power. We aggregate this information to the firm
level (i.e. across banks for each firm).48 The top panel in Table 7 shows that higher effective markups
are negatively correlated with changes in interest rates and default probabilities, and positively correlated
with the changes in demand probabilities and loan use. In particular, we find that a one standard devia-
tion increase in banks’ average effective markup is associated with a 6 percentage points lower change in
price (∆Pijmt), a 2.2 percentage points higher change in the probability of taking a loan (∆QDijmt), a 0.2
percentage points higher change in loan use (∆QLijmt), and a 2.1 percentage points lower change in default
probability (∆Fijmt).
These results confirm the intuition of the effects described in Section 3.3: banks with higher market power
respond to an increase in adverse selection by either lowering their prices or increasing their prices by
less than banks with lower market power. As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), this price reduction (or smaller
price increase) in response to increases in adverse selection attracts more (or loses fewer) of the banks’
increasingly safe marginal borrowers, lowering the average default probability of banks’ borrowers.
6.2 The Effects of Increased Costs of Capital
In our second counterfactual, we explore the consequences of increased capital costs. To do so, we analyze
the counterfactual effects of a 5% increase (roughly 70 basis points) in banks’ marginal costs and compare
these to the effects of increased adverse selection that we simulated in the last subsection. We simulate
48 Appendix Table A.9 shows that we obtain very similar results when we conduct our analysis at the more disaggregate firm-
bank-market-year level.
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Table 7: Regressions of Counterfactual Outcomes’ Changes on Markups
for Higher Adverse Selection and Higher Marginal Costs
Variables ∆Pijmt ∆QDijmt ∆Q
L
ijmt ∆Fijmt
Higher Adverse Selection
Effective Markup -0.38 0.15 0.01 -0.13
(0.06) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Bank-Market-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.134 0.155 0.092 0.097
N obs. 35,563 35,563 35,563 35,563
Higher Marginal Costs
Effective Markup -0.42 0.22 0.01 -0.11
(0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank-Market-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.433 0.451 0.112 0.447
N obs. 35,563 35,563 35,563 35,563
Note: An observation is a firm-market-year. Price, demand probabilities, and loan use changes are measured in percentages. Default
changes are measured in percentage points. See footnote 45 for dependent variables’ definition. Effective Markup is constructed as
the negative of the second term on the right hand side of equation (6). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-market-year level.
this higher cost of capital under the baseline level of adverse selection and examine the price, quantity, and
default responses across firm-bank relationships. As for the previous policy experiment, we then regress the
changes in these outcomes on the effective markups from the baseline model.
The second group of columns in Table 6 shows the change in price, demand, loan use, and default associated
with this 5% increase in banks’ cost of capital. We find that prices always increase when marginal costs rise.
The average increase is 1.78 percentage points (11.0%), comparable to that arising under a doubling of
adverse selection, but with half the standard deviation. As expected, as average prices rise, average demand
and loan use decline. Unlike the case of higher adverse selection, however, default rates only increase by
1.84 percentage points, less than one-third the increase found there. The explanation for this difference is
that while increases in marginal costs increase prices, they do not modify the sensitivity of defaults to price
changes. By contrast, an increase in adverse selection not only increases prices, but also makes borrowers
with high willingness to pay riskier, further decreasing the quality of banks’ borrower pools. For a given
change in price levels, this implies a larger increase in the percentage of defaults.
The bottom panel of Table 7 presents regression results relating these changes in outcomes to our measure of
banks’ market power (their effective markups in our baseline results), where we show that higher effective
markups are associated with reductions in price and default changes and increases in quantity changes. In
particular, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the effective markup reduces the price variation
(∆Pijmt) by around 6.6 percentage points, increases the variation in demand probabilities (∆QDijmt) by
3.5 percentage points and in loan use (∆QLijmt) by around 0.2 percentage points, and reduces variation in
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defaults (∆Fijmt) by 1.7 percentage points.49 As was the case for an environment in which adverse selection
increases, banks with higher market power can better absorb an increase in the cost of capital in the presence
of adverse selection.
6.3 Merger Simulation
In a final counterfactual, we explore the effects of an increase in concentration by simulating a merger
between the two banks with the highest market shares in each of our 702 market-year combinations. On
average, the largest bank in a market has a market share of 22%, while the second-largest has a market share
of 13%. In the counterfactual we change only the ownership structure of the newly merged banks, allowing
them to offer two different prices to each borrower as a result of joint profit maximization.
We simulate this merger under two different scenarios to illustrate the impact of increased adverse selection
on the effects of mergers. First, we allow the two main banks to merge under the baseline level of adverse
selection. We then compare this to outcomes when they merge at the doubled level of adverse selection we
analyzed in our first counterfactual. Table 8 shows the changes in prices, demand, loan use, and default
under each scenario. In the first group of columns, changes in outcomes are with respect to the case of no
merger and our baseline (estimated) levels of adverse selection, whereas in the second case, they are with
respect to the case of no merger and twice our estimated levels.
Under baseline levels of adverse selection, interest rates rise by an estimated 0.15 percentage points (1.0%)
in response to higher concentration. Similar to the findings of Nevo (2000a) in markets for differentiated
cereal products, only a few prices increase in response to the mergers, depending on the degree of substi-
tutability between the differentiated banks. Most of the market-wide average price increase is driven by
price increases of the merged banks, which rise by 0.73 percentage points (or 5.7%) on average. There is
important heterogeneity across markets in this effect, however, with prices decreasing in 16.4% of cases
(and only ever for the merged banks). As expected, given the predicted average price increase, average loan
use declines and average default probabilities rise.
Under higher levels of adverse selection, we find even smaller average price effects of merger. Average
prices decline on a percentage-point basis and over 33% of prices decrease. As a consequence, average
demand probabilities increase slightly and average default probabilities decline. Again, there are differences
across banks: average prices increase slightly in merged banks (0.15 percentage points, or 4.5%), and decline
slightly in non-merged banks. This exercise further confirms that higher adverse selection mitigates the
consequences of increased market power and can even reverse them.
49 We find very similar results when we run these regressions at the firm-bank-market-year level, as reported in Appendix Table
A.9.
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Table 8: Summary Statistics for Counterfactual Changes in Outcomes
for Merger under Baseline and High Adverse Selection
Baseline Adverse Selection High Adverse Selection
Variables Nobs Mean Std. Dev. < 0 Mean Std. Dev. < 0
All Banks
P.P. Price Variation 35,563 0.15 1.52
16.4%
-0.02 1.57
33.2%
% Price Variation 35,563 1.0 9.9 0.4 9.3
P.P. Demand Variation 35,563 -0.19 2.67 0.08 2.98
% Loan Use Variation 35,563 -0.1 1.1 -0.1 1.7
P.P. Default Variation 35,563 0.14 1.18 -0.03 0.96
Merged Banks
P.P. Price Variation 35,563 0.73 6.45
17.1%
0.15 7.64
33.1%
% Price Variation 35,563 5.7 47.1 4.5 47.3
Non-Merged Banks
P.P. Price Variation 35,196 0.06 0.95
0%
-0.04 0.13
11.4%
% Price Variation 35,196 0.3 4.4 -0.0 0.4
Note: These variables are average changes at the firm-market-year level. See footnote 45 for variables’ definition. Loan Use
changes are in thousands of e. There are less firms in this table compared to Table 6 because in three markets there is only one
bank in a market so no merger takes place. Note that in the High Adverse Selection case the mean of the % Price Variation is
positive, but the mean of the P.P. Price Variation is negative. This is driven by the different skewness of the two distributions.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the interaction between imperfect competition and asymmetric information in the
Italian market for small business lines of credit. We use a rich dataset with detailed information about
credit contracts between firms and banks, including all the main Italian credit institutions and a highly
representative sample of firms. We estimate a structural model of firms’ demand for credit, loan use, and
default, and join with it a model of bank pricing to individual firms. We find evidence of adverse selection,
in the form of a positive correlation between unobservables determining both demand and default as well as
loan use and default. We also find a causal effect of interest rates on borrowers’ default, which we interpret
as evidence of moral hazard.
We conduct three counterfactual policy experiments to quantify the importance of adverse selection and
investigate its interaction with market power for prices and credit supply. We show that increases in adverse
selection and in banks’ cost of capital cause prices to increase, demand and loan use to fall, and default to
rise. Higher market power, however, moderates these effects. Similarly, higher adverse selection moderates
and can even reverse the effects of banks’ consolidation on prices, demand probabilities, loan use, and
default.
These findings have several important policy implications. They confirm that, as theory predicts and taken
in isolation, both market power and adverse selection worsen lending conditions. That being said, we
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also document that imperfect competition moderates the effects of adverse selection and vice versa. This
suggests that competition and banking policymakers should jointly consider the two factors, particularly in
those contexts where either is likely to be strong. In practice, the idea that financial markets are characterized
by a trade-off between competition and stability due to informational frictions is diffuse in the policy circles.
Our structural estimates offer a quantitative assessment of the costs and benefits of market power in banking
in the presence of adverse selection.
Of course, these conclusions are predicated on the scope of our study. In particular, our modeling strategy
focuses on a subset of the choices firms and banks make in credit markets and our conclusions should be
interpreted with these choices in mind. First, we have neglected the fact that many Italian firms borrow from
multiple banks, concentrating on each’s largest line of credit. Second, we only focus on the first year in
which a firm borrows from a bank, and have not considered how lending relationships between firms and
banks evolve over time. Third, our estimates do not allow the degree of asymmetric information to vary over
the business cycle. This is important if adverse selection is stronger during recessions, in which case a very
competitive financial sector could amplify the effects of negative aggregate shocks. Finally, given that we
do not estimate borrowing firms’ profits, we cannot directly measure social welfare; as such, our framework
cannot address the issue of the optimal supply of credit. Each of these topics is interesting and worthy of
further research.
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A Appendix For Online Publication
A.1 Conditional Means Results
In this Appendix, we provide details of the conditional means results discussed in Section 3.3. For simplicity,
we focus only on the demand and default equations, and exclude consideration of loan use.
From equation (1), we write the firm’s borrowing decision as a binary choice between the outside good and
the maximum utility it can receive from one of the Jmt inside goods. That is, a firm i will borrow from a
bank j in market m in year t if:
Max
j∈1,...,Jmt
{α¯D0 +X ′DjmtβD + ξDjmt + αDPijmt + Y ′DijmtηD + εDi + νijmt} ≥ νi0mt. (A.1)
This can be rewritten as:
εDi ≥ νi0mt − α¯D0 − Max
j∈1,...,Jmt
{X ′DjmtβD + ξDjmt + αDPijmt + Y ′DijmtηD + νijmt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ti
,
(A.2)
where we can simplify the right-hand side, Ti, into a firm-specific component because each firm i in the
sample is active in a single market and single year and, once we take the maximum, j drops out. That is,
because unobserved demand for credit is firm- and not bank-specific, the additional Type I Extreme Value
errors, νijmt, do not complicate the calculation of the relationship between εDi and ε
F
i . As far as adverse
selection is concerned, we are interested in whether or not a firm borrows at all, not from which bank it
borrows. Given this structure, the results relied upon in the text are straightforward. Because εDi and ε
F
i are
jointly normally distributed with variances σ2D and σ
2
F , and correlation coefficient, ρDF , then
E(εDi |D = 1) = E(εDi |εDi ≥ Ti)
= σD
φ(Ti/σD)
1− Φ(Ti/σD) > 0,
(A.3)
and
E(εFi |D = 1) = ρDF
φ(Ti/σD)
1− Φ(Ti/σD) , (A.4)
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution.
A.2 Numerical Results
A.2.1 Monte Carlo
In this Appendix, we construct a simple Monte Carlo to give intuition for how adverse selection and com-
petition can interact in lending markets. We simulate data for the case of a monopolist bank offering a
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loan to i = 1, ..., I potential borrowers, who are observationally equivalent to the bank and differ only in
their unobserved demand for credit (εDi ) and their utility from default, ε
F
i , which we call their “riskiness”.
For simplicity, we concentrate on the correlation in the unobservables between demand and default (ρDF ),
setting borrowers’ loan amount and loan use to 1.
In the Monte Carlo, we keep these data fixed and vary two parameters: borrowers’ price sensitivity, α, as
a proxy for the strength of the effects of a competitive fringe on the bank’s residual demand curve,50 and
the extent of asymmetric information, ρDF , where ρDF < 0 means advantageous selection and ρDF > 0
means adverse selection. For each of these cases, we compute the bank’s equilibrium price based on the
maximization of its expected profit, as described in Section 3.3.
Formally, let borrower i have utility UDi from taking credit from the bank, utility U
D
i0 from not borrowing,
and utility UFi from defaulting:
UDi = α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i + νi,
UDi0 = νi0,
UFi = ε
F
i ,
(A.5)
where P is the interest rate charged by the bank (common across borrowers since there is no observed
heterogeneity), and νi, νi0 are distributed as type 1 extreme value. We allow εDi and ε
F
i to be jointly normally
distributed, with correlation coefficient −1 ≤ ρDF ≤ 1, and set the variance of εDi to 4 and the variance of
εFi to 1. Last, we set α¯0 = 1. We assume that all borrowers have the same price sensitivity α < 0. Our
asymmetric information assumption implies that the bank doesn’t observe borrower i’s individual demand
and default unobservables, εDi and ε
F
i , but only their distribution in the population of borrowers.
Given this setup, borrower i’s demand probability is:
PrDi = Pr(α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i + νi > νi0)
=
exp(α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i )
1 + exp(α¯0 + αP + εDi )
= Λ(α¯0 + αP + ε
D
i ),
(A.6)
where Λ(·) is the CDF of the logistic distribution. Given PrDi , the bank’s expected market share is Q =∫
PrDi f(ε
D
i )dε
D
i , where f(ε
D
i ) is the density of ε
D
i . Conditional on demand (D = 1), the default probability
follows that implied by the joint normality assumption (Wooldridge 2002) and is:
PrFi,F=1|D=1 = E
[
Pr(εFi > 0|εDi , P )|D = 1, P
]
=
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi , (A.7)
50 In this example, we capture competition versus the outside option, but have verified that increasing the number of banks in the
model gives the same qualitative results.
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where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution, σ is the variance of εDi , and f(εDi |D = 1) is the
density of εDi conditional on borrowing. In this simple setting, the bank faces no observable heterogeneity
in borrowers’ default probability, so its expected share of defaulters is just F = PrFi,F=1|D=1. Given these
probabilities and our supply-side model described in the paper, expected profit-maximization by the bank
delivers the following version of the pricing equation (6):
P =
MC
1− F − F ′ 1α(1−Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Marginal Cost
+
−(1− F ) 1α(1−Q)
1− F − F ′ 1α(1−Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective Markup
, (A.8)
where F ′ is the derivative of the expected default rate with respect to price, and α(1 − Q) is the derivative
of the expected market share with respect to price.
The top graph of Figure A.1 reports effective marginal costs, the bottom graph of Figure A.1 reports the
negative of effective markups, while Figure A.2 combines these to show equilibrium prices. The figures
examine how these three elements vary with different degrees of adverse selection, measured by ρDF , and
“competition” with the outside option, measured by the slope parameter of the monopolist’s residual demand
curve, α.
Looking at the top graph in Figure A.1, for a high level of competition (i.e. the rightmost point on the top
graph) an increase in adverse selection (moving to the northwest) causes effective marginal costs to increase,
whereas for low competition (the point closest to the reader on the top graph, again moving northwest) it
remains relatively constant. The opposite happens for effective markups as we increase adverse selection.
Looking at the bottom graph of Figure A.1, and recalling that it reports the negative of effective markups
(thus a higher markup is associated with a lower point in the graph), for high levels of competition (the right-
most point on the bottom graph, moving to the northwest), increases in adverse selection decrease effective
markups slightly, whereas for low levels of competition, (the closest point to the reader on the bottom graph,
again moving northwest), increases in adverse selection decrease effective markups substantially.
Figure A.2 combines both factors and demonstrates a non-monotonic price response to increases in adverse
selection, with the sign of the effect depending on the level of competition. While equilibrium prices rise
with adverse selection in a competitive environment (the closest point to the reader, moving to the north-
east), the opposite happens in a concentrated market (the leftmost point, moving east). In a competitive
environment, markups are low and the average borrower effect dominates, so increasing adverse selection
causes prices to rise (driven by the rising effective marginal costs shown in Figure A.1). In a less competitive
environment, by contrast, markups are high, enhancing the marginal borrower effect, and increasing adverse
selection drives prices down. In competitive markets, banks have small margins and can only increase prices
in response to increased average selection, while in less competitive markets, banks with higher markups
find it profitable to reduce prices as it allows them to attract relatively safe borrowers.
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Figure A.1: Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Effective Marginal Costs, Negative Effective
Markups
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Note: The vertical axis shows the value of effective marginal costs and of the negative of the effective markups. The left horizontal
axis is level of adverse selection, increasing towards left. The right horizontal axis measures the slope of the residual demand curve
(our measure of competition with the outside option), increasing towards the right.
Figure A.2: Adverse Selection vs Imperfect Competition - Equilibrium Prices
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adverse selection, increasing towards right. The horizontal axis definitions and scales in this figure differ from those in Figure A.1
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A.2.2 ∂F ′/∂ρDF Results
For the simplified setting described in the Monte Carlo, equation (A.7) above presented the formula for the
probability firm i defaults given that it has chosen to borrow,D = 1. In what follows, we derive this formula
and its derivatives in greater detail for use in the discussion in Section 3.3 in the body of the text.
To understand where equation (A.7) came from, note that given the structure of preferences described in
equation (A.5) and the joint normality assumption on εDi and ε
F
i , the probability of default, F = 1, con-
ditioned on a specific εDi is Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ
2
DF
σ2
. When we calculate the conditional probability of default, we
therefore need to take into account that borrowers have selected into the decision to borrow.
In a standard Heckman setting, the selection equation is deterministic: a firm borrows if εDi ≥ α¯0 − αP .
The problem in our case is different because our selection equation gives only a probability of borrowing
conditional on εDi rather than a deterministic threshold. From equation (A.6), we know that:
PrD
i|εDi = Λ(α0 + αP + ε
D
i ). (A.9)
One can then apply Bayes rule to obtain the conditional distribution of εDi given D = 1:
f(εDi |D = 1) =
PrD
i|εDi
f(εDi )
PrDi
=
Λ(α0 + αP + ε
D
i )f(ε
D
i )∫
Λ(α0 + αP + εDi )f(ε
D
i )dε
D
i
.
(A.10)
Then, the probability of default conditional on borrowing is just the expected value of Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ
2
DF
σ2
 under
f(εDi |D = 1). As in equation (A.7) above,
PrFi,F=1|D=1 =
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 f(εDi |D = 1)dεDi . (A.11)
Let Λ(α0 + αP + εDi ) = Λ(.) to simplify the notation. Substituting equation (A.10) into equation (A.11)
we get:
PrFi,F=1|D=1 =
1∫
Λ(.)f(εDi )dε
D
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
Λ(.)f(εDi )dεDi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
. (A.12)
The derivative of default conditional on borrowing with respect to P , that is F ′ijmt in Section 3.3, is given
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by:
∂PrFi,F=1|D=1
∂P
=
∂A
∂P
B +A∂B
∂P
, (A.13)
with the derivative components in this equation given by the following two terms:
∂A
∂P
= −α
∫
Λ(.)(1− Λ(.))f(εDi )dεDi(∫
Λ(.)f(εDi )dε
D
i
)2 ,
∂B
∂P
=
∫
Φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
αΛ(.) (1− Λ(.)) f(εDi )dεDi .
(A.14)
The second derivative of default conditional on borrowing with respect to P and ρDF , referred to in the
body of the text as ∂F ′ijmt/∂ρDF , is given by:
∂2PrFi,F=1|D=1
∂P∂ρDF
=
∂A
∂P
∂B
∂ρDF
+A ∂
2B
∂P∂ρDF
, (A.15)
with the two new derivative components in this equation given by the following terms:
∂B
∂ρDF
=
∫
φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 εDiσ2(
1− ρ2DF
σ2
) 3
2
Λ(.)f(εDi )dε
D
i ,
∂2B
∂P∂ρDF
=
∫
φ
 ρDF εDiσ2√
1− ρ2DF
σ2
 εDiσ2(
1− ρ2DF
σ2
) 3
2
αΛ(.) (1− Λ(.)) f(εDi )dεDi ,
(A.16)
where φ is the PDF of a standard normal distribution. Even in this simple setting, it is difficult to sign these
derivatives analytically. Instead, we simulate them for ρ ∈ [−1, 1], α0 = 0, α = −1, and σ = 1 to obtain
the following figure:
Figure A.3: ∂PrFi,F=1|D=1/∂P
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As can be seen there, the derivative of the default probability with respect to price is the same sign as
ρDF and the slope of this line, measuring ∂2PrFi,F=1|D=1/∂P∂ρDF , is everywhere increasing when ρDF >
0.
A.3 Constructing the Dataset
We have assembled data from the following sources:
• Firm Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Bilanci with yearly (1988-1998) balance sheet data for each
firm, including data both for firms that take credit and those that do not. This data also includes the
year of birth for each firm, its location at the city council level, and what we call in Section 2.2 each
firm’s “Score.” The Score represents our measure of a firm’s observable default risk.
• Loan Data: Dataset from Centrale dei Rischi with yearly (1988-1998) firm-bank loan contracts,
including the amount of granted credit, the amount of this used by the firm, the loan’s interest rate,
and whether or not the firm has defaulted on this loan (Section 2.3 in the paper describes our definition
of default). As discussed in Section 2.1, this data is only available for 94 large banks (representing
more than 80% of total bank lending) and for short term lines of credit.
• Bank Data: Dataset with yearly (1988-2002) balance sheet data for each bank, including yearly total
loans that each bank gives in each province, and its share of the total loans granted in each province.
• Branch Data: Dataset with yearly (1959-2005) branches for the population (∼ 1,500) of banks at the
city council level.
• Coordinates Data: Based on the National Institute for Statistics ISTAT city council classification,
we assign to each city council the geographic coordinates that will allow us to calculate firm-branch
distances.
We first merge the firm data with the loan data, in order to combine all the borrowing and non-borrowing
firms. We then take all the banks actively lending in each province and assume that those represent the
choice set for each firm, regardless of whether they have a branch in that province or not.51 We assume
that each firm chooses one main credit line from among those offered by the banks active in its province or
chooses not to take any line of credit (the outside good). The main line is defined as the line for which the
amount used, regardless of the amount granted, is the highest. For cases in which multiple lines have the
same amount used, then the one with the lowest price is defined as the main line. We calculate the distance
in kilometers between the city council of each firm and the closest city council where each bank from the
choice set has a branch using the geographic coordinates.
A.4 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we fully describe the reduced form evidence summarized in Section 2.4 in the paper.
51 There is evidence in other papers (Bofondi and Gobbi 2006), as well as in our data, that a few banks lend in some provinces
even if they don’t have a branch there.
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Table A.1: Reduced Form Evidence of Imperfect Competition
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log HHI Loans 0.02
(0.00)
Log HHI Firms 0.00
(0.00)
Log CR3 Loans 0.01
(0.01)
Log CR3 Firms 0.02
(0.00)
R2 0.923 0.923 0.923 0.923
N obs. 469,633 469,677 469,666 469,633
Note: The table shows the results of OLS regressions of the predicted interest rate (in percentage points) on lending market
concentration measures at the market-year level. An observation is a firm-bank-year. HHI Loans is the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index based on the share of credit. HHI Firms is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on the share of firms. CR3 Loans is
the concentration ratio for the 3 banks with the highest market share in terms of loans in each market-year. CR3 Firms is the
concentration ratio for the 3 banks with the highest market share in terms of borrowers in each market-year. All regressions include
bank-year fixed effects, bank-market fixed effects, firm fixed effects, amount granted fixed effects and the distance between the firm
and the bank. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-year level.
A.4.1 Imperfect Competition
In this subsection, we provide some descriptive evidence on imperfect competition in the Italian market for
small business lines of credit. We construct four alternative measures of concentration and investigate their
correlation with interest rates conditional on various sets of observables. First, we calculate the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of market concentration based on each bank’s share of used credit within a market-
year (hereafter HHI Loans). Second, we define the same index based instead on each bank’s share of
borrowers within a market-year (HHI Firms). Third, we construct the 3-bank concentration ratio in terms of
used credit in each market-year (CR3 Loans). Finally, we construct the 3-bank concentration ratio in terms
of borrowers in each market-year (CR3 Firms). We then use each of these as regressors in a regression of
the log of predicted interest rates.52 We show in Table A.1 that concentration is positively correlated with
interest rates in all specifications, as expected, and is statistically significant for two out of the four measures
we use. In the first and fourth specifications, respectively in columns (1) and (4), we find that a 10% increase
in concentration is associated with a 0.2% increase in interest rates.
A.4.2 Asymmetric Information
In this subsection, we conduct reduced-form tests for the presence of asymmetric information. To do so, we
follow the early empirical literature on positive correlation tests introduced by Chiappori and Salanié (2000).
52 We use predicted interest rates because it’s the price variable we use in our structural demand model. See Section 4.1 for a
detailed description on how we construct predicted interest rates.
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We propose two tests, one based on the choice to take up a line of credit and another based on the choice
of how much credit to draw on that line. Both tests are based on the correlation between the unobservables
driving these choices and the unobservables influencing default. The choice of these tests gives a flavor of
the identification strategy that we rely on in the structural model, as explained in greater detail in Section
4.3 in the body of the text.
Demand and Default: We start by investigating whether firms that are more likely to demand credit are
also more likely to default. Our data include both firms that borrow and those that do not, while we only
observe default on loans for borrowing firms. We can formalize this problem as a selection model with two
equations:
di = 1(Xdi β + νi > 0),
fi =
{
Xfi γ + ηi if di = 1
− if di = 0,
(A.17)
where di is equal to one if the firm borrows and fi is equal to one if the borrower defaults. fi is observed
only if di = 1. This is similar to the classical selection model analyzed by Heckman (1979), where we
interpret as adverse selection a positive correlation between νi and ηi.53 Results of this Heckman selection
model are reported in the first two columns (“Extensive Margin”) of Table A.2, where the decisions to
borrow and default are regressed on year, market, firms’ Score, amount of granted credit, and sector fixed
effects, as well as on a set of firms’ balance sheet variables. We use as an instrument in the selection
(i.e. borrowing) equation the number of banks in a firm’s market, which we interpret as a proxy for the
competitiveness of banks’ local markets.54 We find a positive and significant correlation coefficient of
0.09 between the unobservables driving demand and default, which we interpret as preliminary evidence of
asymmetric information on the extensive margin.
Loan Use and Default: We then consider the relationship between loan use and default. Unlike the previous
test, we are not in a selection framework as the same firms are observed in both equations. Still, the idea
is the same, as we test for a positive correlation between the unobservables that determine the choice of
“extent of coverage” (loan use) and the occurrence of an “accident” (default), conditional on several firm
characteristics. Following the intuition of the previous test, adverse selection should imply that riskier firms
use more credit. We set up the following seemingly unrelated regression (SUR):
`i = Xiβ + εi,
fi = Xiγ + ηi,
(A.18)
where `i is the amount of its loan used by firm i, and, as before, fi takes value of one if the borrower defaults.
The vector of controls Xi is composed of year, market, bank, firms’ Score, amount of granted credit, and
sector fixed effects, as well as on a set of firms’ balance sheet variables. We specify the distribution of
the residuals εi, ηi as joint normal, with a correlation coefficient ρ. A positive and significant estimate of
53 We estimate default as a linear probability model for ease of interpretation, but estimates from a discrete choice regression
yield similar results.
54 This is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction that it influences demand for credit (via interest rates), but is uncorrelated with
a firm’s idiosyncratic decision to default. We find a first stage F-statistic of 75.94.
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ρ suggests the presence of asymmetric information. The results of this test are summarized in the last two
columns (“Intensive Margin”) of Table A.2. We again find a positive correlation, consistent with asymmetric
information on the intensive margin.
A.5 Matching Model
As discussed in Section 4.1, we must predict the prices charged on loans from banks from whom firms chose
not to borrow. We also need to predict both prices and the amount of granted credit a firm that chooses not
to borrow at all would require should it have chosen to borrow. As summarized in Section 4.1.3, we use
propensity score matching to estimate the prices and amounts of granted credit for non-borrowing firms.
This subsection describes how we do so.
Following Imbens (2004), Imbens and Rubin (2015), and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we construct an
iterative process to appropriately select the relevant variables determining the propensity score and obtain
the best possible match. Our choice of covariates for the matching, that is the variables determining whether
a firm borrows or not, is guided by economic theory and knowledge of the institutional setting, as well as by
the overlap in variables’ distributions and statistics from the matching results.
The final set of variables that we use are all fixed effects and include fixed effects for the year, firms’
Score, firms’ geographical area, sales, and assets. In line with Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we apply
the following specific criteria in our selection in order to determine both which variables to include and the
degree of discretization for the fixed effects. First, we only include controls that influence simultaneously the
participation (borrowing vs non-borrowing) and the outcome variables (interest rates or amount of granted
credit, depending on the variable we are predicting). Second, variables must be unaffected by participation,
or the anticipation of it, so should be either fixed over time or measured before participation. The Score
respects this rule, and we assume that the value of assets and sales are persistent over time. We choose to
only control for a Score above or below 6, as Rodano, Serrano-Velarde and Tarantino (2015) showed that
this is the most relevant threshold level for lending standards. Third, for the common support assumption to
hold, some randomness is needed, so some firms with identical characteristics should be observed in each
state (borrowing versus not). For this reason, we choose a parsimonious set of variables and seek to avoid
over-parametrization.
We summarize in Table A.3 the normalized differences in means between treatment (non-borrowers) and
control (borrowers) groups.55 Imbens (2004) defines as “modest” normalized differences below 0.3 in abso-
lute value, and all of our differences for the continuous variables used are below that threshold. We imple-
ment several matching methods and find similar results across them. We choose to focus on k-nearest neigh-
bor matching, as it allows us to assign several untreated (borrowing) firms to each treated (non-borrowing)
one.
We follow the standard literature in performing several statistical tests to assess the quality of the matching.
Variable selection is based on statistical significance, the “hit or miss” method (Heckman, Ichimura and
55 The normalized difference for a variable with mean µ and variance σ2 is given by µT−µC√
σ2
T
+σ2
C
/2
, where T stands for treated
(non-borrowing) and C stands for control (borrowing) groups.
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Table A.2: Reduce Form Evidence for Adverse Selection
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Variables Demand Default Loan Use Default
Correlation between Unobservables 0.09 0.03
(0.01) (0.00)
Total Assets 0.55 0.00 0.34 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Intangible Assets -0.95 -0.04 -0.39 -0.03
(0.07) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.39 0.01 -0.08 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01)
Sales 0.46 -0.00 -0.05 -0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Profits 0.53 0.02 0.48 0.01
(0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (0.01)
Cash Flow -0.43 -0.03 -2.29 -0.02
(0.07) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
Trade Debit -0.17 0.00 -0.08 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Firm’s Age 0.54 0.01 -0.07 0.01
(0.07) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01)
Number of Banks in Market 0.04 - -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Distance to Branch - - -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Interest Rate - - -0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Score FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Granted FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.222 0.091 0.437 0.094
N Obs. 36,520 25,351 25,351 25,351
Note: The table shows the results of a Heckman selection model for Demand and Default (Extensive Margin) and of a SUR model
for Loan Use and Default (Intensive Margin). The dependent variable is a dummy for credit demand in Column 1, a dummy for
default in column 2 and 4, and the amount of credit used in column 3. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. The excluded instrument
for the selection model is the number of banks in a firm’s market. In each regression an observation is a firm. We rescale some
variables to interpret the coefficients more easily: Intangible Assets, Sales, Total Assets, Profits, and Cashflow are in e100,000.
Trade Debit is in e1,000,000. Age of Firm is in 100 years.
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Table A.3: Normalized Differences
Variable Obs Normalized Difference
Score 52,310 -0.294
Sales 52,310 -0.076
Total Assets 52,310 -0.066
Figure A.4: Matching Graph and Common Support
−50 0 50 100
Standardized % bias across covariates
Unmatched
Matched 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Todd 1997),56 and comparisons of several statistics before and after the matching. These include the Pseudo-
R-squared, the Likelihood Ratio, the mean and median bias, and Rubin’sB andR.57 Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008) explain that a rule of thumb for a good match is to have mean and median biases below 3% to 5%.
According to Leuven and Sianesi (2003), Rubin’sB should be below 25% and Rubin’sR should be between
0.5 and 2. Finally, a good matching outcome should deliver Pseudo R-squared and Likelihood Ratio tests
high in the unmatched case, and very low in the matched case. Our results pass all these statistical tests, as
shown in Tables A.4 and A.5. Last, we show a graph of the bias reduction and test the common support of
the propensity score between treated and untreated in Figure A.4. Even though there is a large mass at each
tail, these figures show that the values for both groups span the full range of propensity scores, implying that
we have enough overlap as long as we allow for replacement.
56 Variables are chosen to maximize within-sample prediction rates, i.e. maximizing the cases in which the estimated propensity
score for each observation is greater than the sample proportion of firms taking the treatment (in our case not borrowing).
57 B is the number of standard deviations between the means of the groups, and R is the ratio of treatment variance to control
variance (Rubin 2001).
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Table A.4: Matching Results 1
Unmatched Mean % Bias t-Test
Variable vs. Matched Treated Control % Bias Reduction t p>|t|
1991-1992 U 0.392 0.132 -33.6 -32.57 0.000
M 0.392 0.392 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
1993-1994 U 0.333 0.308 5.6 5.90 0.000
M 0.333 0.333 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
1995-1996 U 0.249 0.110 37.1 41.82 0.000
M 0.249 0.249 0.0 99.9 0.03 0.980
1997-1998 U 0.309 0.245 14.2 15.25 0.000
M 0.309 0.309 -0.0 99.8 -0.02 0.981
Score>6 U 0.281 0.358 -16.5 -17.24 0.000
M 0.281 0.281 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
North Area U 0.656 0.662 -1.3 -1.35 0.176
M 0.656 0.656 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Sales Category 2 U 0.391 0.114 67.3 77.37 0.000
M 0.391 0.391 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Sales Category 3 U 0.135 0.229 -24.7 -25.17 0.000
M 0.135 0.135 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Sales Category 4 U 0.055 0.265 -59.8 -57.30 0.000
M 0.055 0.055 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Sales Category 5 U 0.056 0.265 -59.3 -56.92 0.000
M 0.056 0.056 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Assets Category 2 U 0.275 0.166 26.3 28.85 0.000
M 0.275 0.275 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Assets Category 3 U 0.132 0.231 -25.9 -26.36 0.000
M 0.132 0.132 0.0 100.0 -0.00 1.000
Assets Category 4 U 0.079 0.255 -48.6 -47.59 0.000
M 0.079 0.079 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Assets Category 5 U 0.061 0.263 -57.0 -54.94 0.000
M 0.061 0.061 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000
Table A.5: Matching Results 2
Sample Pseudo-R2 LR χ2 p > χ2 Mean Bias Median Bias Rubin’s B Rubin’s R
Unmatched 0.367 23,790.6 0.000 34.1 30.0 170.0 1.26
Matched -0.000 -0.00 1.000 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.00
Note: A rule of thumb for a good match is to have mean and median biases below 3% to 5%, Rubin’s B below 25% and Rubin’s R
between 0.5 and 2.
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A.6 The Effects of Measurement Error in Predicted Prices
As discussed in footnotes 21 (in Section 4.1.1), 28 (in Section 4.1.3), and 31 (in Section 4.2.1), we assume
that our model of price prediction does not induce conventional econometric measurement error problems.
In this subsection, we demonstrate that as long as the residuals in the pricing regression are uncorrelated
with default unobservables, any measurement error due to our use of predicted prices can at most result in a
conservative estimate of the degree of adverse selection.
To do so, we outline a stylized version of our structural model to investigate the potential direction of the
bias due to measurement error in prices in the correlation coefficients that identify adverse selection, our
main coefficients of interest. We define firm i’s utility from demanding (superscript D) from bank j, and its
utility from defaulting (superscript F ), to depend only on price and unobservables. We decompose prices
into what we can and cannot predict as follows:
Pij = P˜ij + τ˜ij , (A.19)
where Pij is the true price, P˜ij is the predicted price, and τ˜ij is the measurement error. We identify adverse
selection as a positive correlation between the unobservables of the demand and default equations, εDi and
εFi :
UDij = α
DPij + ε
D
i , (A.20)
UFij = α
FPij + ε
F
i . (A.21)
As described at length in Section 4.1.3, our preferred model of price prediction uses data on all the loans
taken by each firm, allowing us to include firm fixed effects in its estimation. The fourth column of Table 2
shows that this significantly increases the fit of the regression (as measured by its R2) and the fourth column
of Table 3 shows that the residuals from this pricing regression are uncorrelated with default. In this stylized
model, we therefore claim that the measurement error, τ˜ij , is uncorrelated with εFi .
Recall also that in our structural model, we only use predicted prices in the demand estimation and not in
the estimation of the loan use and default equations. In this stylized model, this means we only need to
account for measurement error in equation (A.20) and not equation (A.21). Substituting (A.19) in (A.20),
we get:
UDij = α
D(P˜ij + τ˜ij) + ε
D
i = α
DP˜ij + ζij , (A.22)
where ζij ≡ αD τ˜ij + εDi . The true correlation coefficient between the propensity to borrow and to default
is defined by:
ρDF =
Cov(εDi , ε
F
i )
σεDi
σεFi
. (A.23)
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In the presence of measurement error, we would estimate:
ρ˜DF =
Cov(ζij , εFi )
σζijσεFi
=
Cov(εDi , ε
F
i )
(σεDi
+ αDστ˜ij )σεFi
= ρDF
σεDi
σεDi
+ αDστ˜ij
, (A.24)
where the second equality follows from the assumed lack of correlation between τ˜ij and εFi . One can see
that the only effect of measurement error in (A.24) is the additional variance in the composite demand error
caused by the measurement error.
Equation (A.24) shows that, typical of classical measurement error problems, in the presence of measure-
ment error our estimate of ρDF would be biased towards zero. The size of any bias would depend on both
αD and the standard deviation of τ˜ij relative to that of εDi , that is, the firm’s private information. We believe
that our price prediction reduces measurement error to a minimum. Indeed, as we argue in the text, firms
too are likely to predict banks’ prices, rather than getting a price quotation from each of them, suggesting
the variance of the demand error (which we normalize in the text to that of the standard Type I Extreme
Value) using our predicted prices should be comparable to that of firms. Even if this weren’t the case, equa-
tion (A.24) shows that the degree of adverse selection we estimate is a lower bound on the true degree of
adverse selection. Measurement error by itself, therefore, cannot explain the correlation we find between
the propensity to demand credit and to default.
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A.7 Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.6: IV First Stage and OLS vs IV Second Stage for Demand
First Stage Second Stage
Variable Interest Rate OLS IV
Number Accounts 2nd quintile 0.05 - -
(0.01)
Number Accounts 3rd quintile 0.07 - -
(0.01)
Number Accounts 4th quintile 0.03 - -
(0.01)
Number Accounts 5th quintile 0.02 - -
(0.01)
Deposit Rate 2nd quintile 0.05 - -
(0.01)
Deposit Rate 3rd quintile 0.08 - -
(0.01)
Deposit Rate 4th quintile 0.08 - -
(0.02)
Deposit Rate 5th quintile 0.11 - -
(0.02)
Log of Deposit Amount -0.06 - -
(0.03)
Interest Rate - 0.16 -1.45
(0.22) (0.62)
Number of Branches 0.00 4.37 4.38
(0.02) (0.21) (0.21)
Share of Branches 0.00 0.53 0.53
(0.00) (0.05) (0.05)
Years in Market 0.03 0.01 0.06
(0.00) (0.01) (0.03)
Constant 0.95 -3.05 -4.14
(0.46) (0.24) (3.66)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,036 6,036 6,036
R2 0.670 0.766 0.766
F-Stat 25.67 - -
Note: Standard errors in brackets. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-year level.
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Table A.7: IV First Stage for Loan Use and Default
First Stage
Variable Interest Rate
Interest Rates in Other Markets 0.56
(0.04)
Constant 8.37
(3.14)
Firm Controls Yes
Bank Controls Yes
Score FE Yes
Sector FE Yes
Loan Amount FE Yes
Bank FE Yes
Market-Year FE Yes
Obs 35,173
R2 0.376
F-Stat 184.24
Note: Standard errors in brackets. Firm and bank controls include respectively all the firm level and bank level controls in Table 4.
Standard errors are clustered at the market-year level.
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Table A.8: Structural Estimates with Random Coefficient on Prices
Variables Demand Loan Use Default
Price
{
Interest Rate -1.40 -0.03 0.92
(0.62) (0.00) (0.02)
Assets

Total Assets 5.68 0.09 -0.03
(0.08) (0.00) (0.03)
Intangible/Total Assets -0.79 -0.01 0.09
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05)
Profitability

Profits 1.08 0.01 0.03
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Firm Level Cash Flow -0.92 -0.05 -0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Sales 6.97 -0.01 -0.36
(0.07) (0.00) (0.04)
Debt
{
Trade Debit -3.34 -0.04 0.12
(0.05) (0.00) (0.02)
Others

Firm’s Age 0.22 0.00 0.02
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Distance to Branch -1.24 -0.01 -0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.06)

Number of Branches 4.35 0.01 0.02
(0.15) (0.00) (0.02)
Bank Level Share of Branches 0.53 -0.07 -0.22
(0.04) (0.01) (0.10)
Years in Market 0.06 0.01 -0.10
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02)

Score Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes
First-stage fixed effects Loan Amount Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Market-Year Yes No No
Bank No Yes Yes
Market-Year No Yes Yes
Observations 506,230 25,351 25,351
Covariance matrix (Σ)

σD = 0.19
(0.00)
ρDL = 0.04 σL = 0.30
(0.00) (0.00)
Adverse Selection
ρDF = 0.09 ρLF = 0.09 σF = 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Note: All coefficients are estimated in the first stage, with the exception of the Interest Rate, the Number of Branches, the Share
of Branches and the Years in Market for the demand equation, that are estimated in the second stage. Second stage fixed effects,
only for the demand equation, are at the bank, market and year level. See Table 1 for variables’ definition. Standard errors are
in brackets. First stage standard errors are calculated by the inverse of the Information matrix, obtained providing the solver with
analytical gradient and hessian. Second stage standard errors are computed with 200 bootstrap replications.
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Figure A.5: Default Probability Distribution for Baseline Scenario and
for Higher Adverse Selection Counterfactual Scenario
Table A.9: Regressions of Counterfactual Outcomes’ Changes on Markups
for Higher Adverse Selection and Higher Marginal Costs
Variables ∆Pijmt ∆QDijmt ∆QLijmt ∆Fijmt
Higher Adverse Selection
Effective Markup -0.25 0.14 0.02 -0.12
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07)
Bank-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.763 0.787 0.125 0.896
N obs. 434,490 418,667 434,490 421,407
Higher Marginal Costs
Effective Markup -0.30 0.21 0.01 -0.27
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Bank-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.750 0.682 0.130 0.830
N obs. 434,490 418,740 434,490 420,122
Note: An observation is a firm-bank-market-year. Price, demand probabilities, and loan use changes are measured in percentages.
Default changes are measured in percentage points. See footnote 45 for dependent variables’ definition. Effective Markup is
constructed as the negative of the second term on the right hand side of equation (6). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Note that we omit the top 3 percentiles of the markup distribution, to avoid our results being driven by outliers. Given the presence
of outliers also in the demand and default percentage variations, we omit the top 3 percentiles from those distributions as well.
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